ABSTRACT

Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach.

摘要

最近，许多作者争辩说，关于决定论和自由意志的主张位于不同的描述层次上，并且在一个层次上的决定论并不排除在另一个层次上的自由意志。本文重点介绍克里斯蒂安·李斯特对这一基本思想的版本。有人认为，李斯特的说法并不排除关于自由意志和决定论的不相容论的最合理版本，并且更具建设性的是，基于水平的自由意志方法更有机会迎接怀疑的挑战，如果它是以道德层面的推理为指导——到目前为止，这种方法的支持者还没有认真考虑过这一层面。