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Investors' Perceptions of Activism via Voting: Evidence from Contentious Shareholder Meetings*
Contemporary Accounting Research ( IF 3.2 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-10 , DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12705
Francois Brochet 1 , Fabrizio Ferri 2 , Gregory S. Miller 3
Affiliation  

Motivated by the increasing influence of shareholder votes on corporate policies, we examine investors' perceptions of activism via voting. To identify instances of activism via voting, we focus on annual meetings with at least one ballot item where a substantial fraction of shareholders is expected to vote against management's voting recommendation, indicating an increase in their monitoring activity. We define such meetings as “contentious.” Using a sample of almost 28,000 meetings between 2003 and 2012, we examine stock returns over the period between the proxy filing and the annual meeting. This period captures when investors learn about the contentious nature of the upcoming meeting and form expectations about its likely impact on firms' policies. We find that abnormal stock returns prior to contentious meetings are significantly positive and higher than those prior to noncontentious meetings. These higher abnormal returns increase with the contentiousness of the meeting; are more pronounced in firms with poor past performance, which are more likely to respond to shareholder pressure; and persist after controlling for firm-specific news and proxies for risk factors. Our results are consistent with investors' expecting activism via voting to have a positive impact on firm value, on average, and cast doubts on regulatory attempts to restrict the use of shareholder votes.

中文翻译:

投资者通过投票对激进主义的看法:来自有争议的股东大会的证据*

由于股东投票对公司政策的影响越来越大,我们通过投票研究了投资者对激进主义的看法。为了通过投票确定激进主义的实例,我们专注于至少有一个投票项目的年度会议,其中很大一部分股东预计会投票反对管理层的投票建议,这表明他们的监督活动有所增加。我们将此类会议定义为“有争议的”。使用 2003 年至 2012 年间近 28,000 次会议的样本,我们检查了从代理提交到年度会议期间的股票回报。这一时期捕捉到投资者了解即将举行的会议的争议性质并对其可能对公司政策产生影响的预期。我们发现,有争议的会议之前的异常股票收益显着正且高于非争议会议之前的收益。这些较高的异常收益随着会议的争论而增加;在过去业绩不佳的公司中更为明显,这些公司更有可能对股东压力做出反应;并在控制了特定于公司的新闻和风险因素的代理后持续存在。我们的结果与投资者预期通过投票进行的激进主义平均对公司价值产生积极影响的预期一致,并对限制使用股东投票的监管尝试表示怀疑。更有可能回应股东压力;并在控制了特定于公司的新闻和风险因素的代理后持续存在。我们的结果与投资者预期通过投票进行的激进主义平均对公司价值产生积极影响的预期一致,并对限制使用股东投票的监管尝试表示怀疑。更有可能回应股东压力;并在控制了特定于公司的新闻和风险因素的代理后持续存在。我们的结果与投资者预期通过投票进行的激进主义平均对公司价值产生积极影响的预期一致,并对限制使用股东投票的监管尝试表示怀疑。
更新日期:2021-06-10
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