In this study, I analyze games in which the functions mapping a vector of efforts into each player's share of the prize and its value exhibit an arbitrary degree of homogeneity. I present a simple way to compute the equilibrium strategy and sufficient conditions for a unique interior symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The setup nests Malueg and Yates (2006), who exploit homogeneity for rent-seeking contests with exogenous prize valuation, and shows that homogeneity can be used to solve (i) a wider range of rent-seeking contests and (ii) other classes of games, like Cournot games with nonlinear inverse demand and possibly non homogeneous goods.

中文翻译：

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具有同质生产函数和同质估值的博弈中的均衡努力

在这项研究中，我分析了将努力向量映射到每个玩家的奖金份额的函数及其价值表现出任意程度的同质性的游戏。我提出了一种简单的方法来计算独特的内部对称纯策略纳什均衡的均衡策略和充分条件。该设置嵌套了 Malueg 和 Yates (2006)，他们利用同质性来解决具有外生奖金估值的寻租竞赛，并表明同质性可用于解决 (i) 更广泛的寻租竞赛和 (ii) 其他类别的游戏，例如具有非线性逆需求和可能非同质商品的古诺游戏。