We advance a critical examination of two recent branches of the enactivist research program, namely, Radically Enactive Cognition and Linguistic Bodies. We argue that, although these approaches may look like diverging views within the wider enactivist program, when appraised in a conciliatory spirit, they can be interpreted as developing converging ideas. We examine how the notion of know-how figures in them to show an important point of convergence, namely, that the normativity of human cognitive capacities rests on shared know-how. Radical enactivism emphasizes the diachronic dimension of shared know-how, and linguistic bodies emphasize the synchronic one. Given that know-how is a normative notion, it is subject to success conditions. We then argue it implies basic content, which is the content of the successful ongoing interactions between agent(s) and environment. Basic content does not imply accuracy conditions and representational content, so it evades Hutto and Myin’s Hard Problem of Content. Moreover, this account is amenable to the central claim by Di Paolo et al. that the participatory sense-making relations at play in linguistic exchanges are explained in continuity with explanations of biological organization and sensorimotor engagements.

我们对生成主义研究计划的两个最新分支进行了批判性检查，即激进生成认知和语言体。我们认为，虽然这些方法在更广泛的行动主义计划中可能看起来有分歧，但当以和解的精神进行评估时，它们可以被解释为发展趋同的想法。我们研究了其中的专有技术概念如何显示一个重要的收敛点，即人类认知能力的规范性依赖于共享的专有技术. 激进的生成主义强调共享知识的历时维度，而语言体则强调共时维度。鉴于专有技术是一个规范性概念，它受制于成功条件。然后我们认为它意味着基本内容，即代理与环境之间成功持续交互的内容。基本内容并不意味着准确性条件和代表性内容，因此它避免了 Hutto 和 Myin 的内容难题。此外，该帐户符合 Di Paolo 等人的中心主张。在语言交流中发挥作用的参与性感知关系的解释与生物组织和感觉运动参与的解释是连续的。