Auctions are inherently risky: bidders face uncertainty about their prospects of winning and payments, while sellers are unsure about revenue and chances of a successful sale. Auction rules influence the allocation of risk among agents and the behavior of risk-averse bidders, leading to a breakdown of payoff and revenue equivalence and a heightened significance of auction design decisions by sellers. In this paper, we review the literature on risk aversion in auctions, with an emphasis on what can be learned about auction design from theoretical modeling and empirical studies. We survey theoretical results relating to the behavior of risk-averse agents in auctions, the comparison of standard auction formats in the presence of risk aversion and implications for auction design. We discuss standard and more recent approaches to identifying risk preferences in empirical studies and evidence for the significance of risk aversion in auction applications. Finally, we identify areas where existing evidence is relatively scant and ask what questions empirical research might ask given the theory and where further theoretical research may be beneficial given existing empirical results.

拍卖本质上是有风险的：投标人面临中标和付款前景的不确定性，而卖家则不确定收入和成功销售的机会。拍卖规则会影响代理人之间的风险分配和规避风险的投标人的行为，导致收益和收入等价的崩溃以及卖方拍卖设计决策的重要性增加。在本文中，我们回顾了有关拍卖中风险规避的文献，重点是可以从理论模型和实证研究中学到关于拍卖设计的知识。我们调查了与拍卖中规避风险代理人的行为有关的理论结果，在存在风险规避的情况下标准拍卖格式的比较以及对拍卖设计的影响。我们讨论了在实证研究中识别风险偏好的标准方法和最近的方法，以及在拍卖应用中风险规避重要性的证据。最后，我们确定现有证据相对不足的领域，并询问实证研究可能会提出哪些理论问题，以及根据现有实证结果，进一步的理论研究可能对哪些领域有益。