The current study examines the effect of disinvestment (dilution of state ownership) and local political corruption on R&D spending in enterprises owned by the central government of India. Based on certain characteristic features of innovation as a strategy available to state-owned enterprises, I build two sets of hypotheses formalising the channels of how these variables may affect the possibility and amount of R&D. Data is drawn from multiple sources to compile a dataset that covers all manufacturing central government-owned enterprises in India over a period of ten years from 2007 to 2016. The study employs an instrumental variable technique to reduce the endogeneity between disinvestment and R&D decisions. We find that, while disinvestment and local political corruption have strong negative effects on whether a firm invests in R&D or not, it has no effect on the amount of R&D. In fact, the amount is driven by a host of firm-specific factors such as size, profit and proficiency of the share of skilled labor, managerial strength and non-unionisation of labor. We also find that the effects are strongly driven by the size of firms, special status awarded to firms and the ideology of the state where the enterprise operates.

目前的研究考察了撤资（国有股权稀释）和地方政治腐败对印度中央政府所有企业研发支出的影响。基于创新作为国有企业可用战略的某些特征，我建立了两组假设，将这些变量如何影响研发的可能性和数量的渠道形式化。数据来自多个来源，编制了一个数据集，该数据集涵盖了 2007 年至 2016 年十年间印度所有制造业中央政府所有企业。该研究采用工具变量技术来减少撤资和研发决策之间的内生性。我们发现，虽然撤资和地方政治腐败对企业是否投资研发有很大的负面影响，但对研发的数量没有影响。事实上，这一数额是由许多特定于公司的因素驱动的，例如规模、利润和熟练劳动力份额的熟练程度、管理力量和劳动力的非工会化。我们还发现，企业规模、授予企业的特殊地位以及企业经营所在国家的意识形态强烈推动了这些影响。