Abstract

Decision theory and folk psychology purport to represent the same phenomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. But they use different concepts. Can we account for the concepts of one with the other’s? If not, we’d have two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation, a dubious dualism. Many might then reject one of the two pictures, yet neither can be jettisoned lightly. Folk psychology structures daily life, and decision theory pervades various scientific disciplines. I’m interested in accounting for two central folk psychological concepts—believing and wanting—with decision theory. Many have attempted this task for believing. (The Lockean Thesis says that such an account exists.) This paper concerns the parallel task for wanting. I give necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in terms of decision theory, for when you’re truly said to want. I propose an alternative to orthodox accounts that link wanting to preference (e.g. Stalnaker (1984), Lewis (1986)). My account explains the context-sensitivity of want ascriptions, makes sense of conflicting desires, and accommodates phenomena that motivate traditional theses on which ‘want’ has multiple senses (e.g. all-things-considered vs. pro tanto).

中文翻译：

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决策理论与想要有什么关系？

摘要

决策理论和民间心理学声称代表了相同的现象：我们的信仰状、欲望和偏好状状态。他们还声称对这些表示做同样的工作：解释和预测我们的行为。但是他们使用不同的概念。我们能解释一个概念和另一个概念吗？如果不是，我们将有两种相互竞争的表示和预测和解释系统，一种可疑的二元论。许多人可能会拒绝这两张照片中的一张，但也不能轻易放弃。民间心理学构建了日常生活，决策理论遍及各种科学学科。我有兴趣用决策理论解释两个核心的民间心理学概念——相信和想要。许多人为了相信而尝试了这项任务。（洛克论文说存在这样的帐户。）本文涉及想要的并行任务。我给出了必要和充分条件，根据决策理论的说法，当你真正想要的时候。我提出了一种替代将想要与偏好联系起来的正统帐户的方法（例如 Stalnaker（1984），Lewis（1986））。我的解释解释了想要归因的上下文敏感性，理解了相互冲突的欲望，并适应了激发“想要”具有多种意义的传统论点的现象（例如，考虑到所有事物 vs. pro tanto）。