POLITICAL theorists and philosophers typically think of agents as morally responsible for injustice when two conditions obtain: the agents’ behavior—their acts, attempts, and omissions—leads to or results in some wrongful event or condition (causation); and, that behavior is proscribed or violates moral requirements (culpability). Few people doubt that when injustice follows straightforwardly from the culpable behavior of some agent, that agent “is responsible” or should be “held responsible” for it. This conception of responsibility captures a widely held understanding (at least in the West) of commonsense morality, one that seems to connect agency to redress in the right way by linking causation and blameworthy behavior with an obligation to make amends, to put things right. Moral responsibility is only one species of responsibility: legal liability often (but not always) tracks moral responsibility (they diverge, for instance, in cases of strict liability). In addition, relationships can give rise to responsibility: I might have a special obligation to clear my neighbor’s sidewalk of snow simply because she needs the help and is close to me. Some theorists maintain that we have responsibilities to help others by virtue of our capacity to do so without giving up anything of moral significance. Further, certain social roles create responsibility:

中文翻译：

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从政治角度解读责任

当两个条件获得时，政治理论家和哲学家通常认为代理人对不公正负有道德责任：代理人的行为——他们的行为、企图和不作为——导致或导致某些错误的事件或条件（因果关系）；并且，该行为被禁止或违反道德要求（有罪）。很少有人怀疑，当不公正直接源于某个代理人的过错行为时，该代理人“有责任”或应该“承担责任”。这种责任概念体现了对常识道德的广泛理解（至少在西方），这种理解似乎通过将因果关系和应受谴责的行为与纠正、纠正事情的义务联系起来，将能动性与以正确的方式进行纠正联系起来。道德责任只是一种责任：法律责任通常（但并非总是）跟踪道德责任（例如，在严格责任的情况下，它们是不同的）。此外，人际关系会产生责任感：我可能有特殊的义务去清除邻居人行道上的积雪，因为她需要帮助并且离我很近。一些理论家坚持认为，我们有责任在不放弃任何道德意义的情况下帮助他人。此外，某些社会角色会产生责任：一些理论家坚持认为，我们有责任在不放弃任何道德意义的情况下帮助他人。此外，某些社会角色会产生责任：一些理论家坚持认为，我们有责任在不放弃任何道德意义的情况下帮助他人。此外，某些社会角色会产生责任：