ONE interesting, but rarely noted, electoral outcome of November 8, 2016 was that Maine became the first state in the United States of America to reject first-past-the-post voting (hereafter “plurality rule”) and adopt preferential voting instead. Should states and countries follow Maine’s lead? In the wake of 2016, many have argued that preferential voting produces different, better outcomes in terms of their consequences with respect to candidates (that is, it has better effects with respect to who runs, and who wins). These arguments turn out to be far more complex and contentious than their proponents seem to recognize. Which should prompt us to ask whether there is a simpler, more ecumenical case against plurality rule. That is what I aim to provide in this article. The key will be to shift our focus away from questions about electoral consequences with respect to candidates and towards fraught electoral choices for voters. These choices mostly arise in contexts where A and B are the only candidates who have a chance of winning, but C is the only candidate whom it is morally conscionable to endorse: A is a greater evil, B is a lesser evil, and C is a principled but unpopular candidate. Under plurality rule, the only way for voters to decrease the odds that A wins is to endorse B, and thereby endorse a lesser evil. There are two compatible bases for thinking that an electoral system should not generate such fraught choices for voters. One rests on thinking that there are two types of moral norms (for example, consequentialist and expressive norms) that conflict in such cases, generating actual voting dilemmas. Another is that to many voters there seem to be two types of norms that conflict in such cases, generating apparent dilemmas. Such apparent dilemmas are still morally problematic, primarily because they lead to prolific political miscommunication: since votes are (treated as) expressive acts, ballots cast for B will be (mis)interpreted as endorsements of B. There is an important broader lesson from this discussion. When we evaluate voting decisions, many think we should focus on much more than how they affect electoral results. The central point of this article is that the same holds when we

中文翻译：

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反对多元化规则的表达性案例

2016 年 11 月 8 日的一个有趣但鲜为人知的选举结果是，缅因州成为美国第一个拒绝以多数票通过投票（以下简称“多数规则”）而采用优先投票的州。州和国家是否应该效仿缅因州的做法？在 2016 年之后，许多人认为优先投票在对候选人的影响方面产生了不同的、更好的结果（也就是说，它对谁跑谁赢有更好的影响）。事实证明，这些论点比他们的支持者似乎认识到的要复杂得多，也更有争议。这应该促使我们问是否有一个更简单、更普遍的反对多元规则的案例。这就是我在本文中要提供的内容。关键是将我们的注意力从有关候选人的选举后果的问题上转移到选民的令人担忧的选举选择上。这些选择主要出现在 A 和 B 是唯一有机会获胜的候选人，但 C 是唯一在道德上合乎情理的候选人的情况下：A 是更大的邪恶，B 是较小的邪恶，C 是一位有原则但不受欢迎的候选人。在多数规则下，选民降低 A 获胜几率的唯一方法是支持 B，从而支持较小的邪恶。认为选举制度不应为选民带来如此令人担忧的选择有两个兼容的基础。一种是认为有两种类型的道德规范（例如，结果主义和表达规范）在这种情况下会发生冲突，从而产生实际的投票困境。另一个原因是，对于许多选民而言，在这种情况下似乎有两种规范相互冲突，从而产生明显的困境。这种明显的困境在道德上仍然存在问题，主要是因为它们导致了大量的政治误解：由于投票被（视为）表达行为，投给 B 的选票将被（错误地）解释为对 B 的认可。从中可以得出一个重要的更广泛的教训讨论。当我们评估投票决定时，许多人认为我们应该关注的不仅仅是它们如何影响选举结果。这篇文章的中心点是，当我们 由于投票是（被视为）表达行为，投给 B 的选票将被（错误地）解释为对 B 的认可。这次讨论有一个重要的更广泛的教训。当我们评估投票决定时，许多人认为我们应该关注的不仅仅是它们如何影响选举结果。这篇文章的中心点是，当我们 由于投票是（被视为）表达行为，投给 B 的选票将被（错误地）解释为对 B 的认可。这次讨论有一个重要的更广泛的教训。当我们评估投票决定时，许多人认为我们应该关注的不仅仅是它们如何影响选举结果。这篇文章的中心点是，当我们