Social conditions driving refugees from El Salvador to seek asylum in the US have changed dramatically since the summer of 2015. After more than a decade of intergang warfare and criminal violence, the maras in El Salvador have become political actors. They have declared the formation of a new supra-organization, Mara-503, and announced that they intend to shape the political process in El Salvador and potentially the entire Central American region. As a result, people fleeing violence in El Salvador should be considered political refugees as defined by US immigration courts and United Nations charters. This essay is based on research conducted in El Salvador, and as an expert witness in cases for refugees from El Salvador. It outlines the emergence of a “Third Generation” of gang organizations, the threats to social order in El Salvador, and the approach immigration lawyers should pursue in refugee cases. K E Y W O R D S : El Salvador, gangs, refugees, private security 1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N For more than 35 years, the path to legitimate political power in El Salvador has been through violence. The Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) began in 1980 as a “death squad”, led by its founder Roberto D’Aubuisson. According to human rights reports and declassified documents from the US Government, ARENA carried out the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, in addition to hundreds of other extra-judicial killings. The Farabundo Martı́ National Liberation Front (FMLN) began as an armed coalition of five separate leftist organizations who declared war against the Salvadoran Government in 1980. In January 1992, after more than 12 years of protracted civil war, the Government under President Alfredo Cristiani of the ARENA Party signed a peace agreement with the leaders of the FMLN. Known as the Chapultepec Peace Accords, this agreement allowed the FMLN to participate in electoral politics, and set into motion the complete re-organization of El Salvador’s military and police forces. * Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Minnesota, 271 19 Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA. Email: pjm@umn.edu VC Author(s) [2017]. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com 1 Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2017, 36, 1–24 doi: 10.1093/rsq/hdx011 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 September 2017 Article Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/36/4/1/4108107 by University of Minnesota Law Library user on 22 February 2018 The gangs of El Salvador today are following a well-known and successful trajectory towards political legitimacy, despite their history of brutal violence that make this goal appear naı̈ve and misguided. In fact, the decades-long rivalry and hostility between the ARENA and FMLN parties has created a space for the gangs to more effectively enter the political system. Officials estimate that as many as 600,000 family members and allies support the general tactics and political objectives of the gangs. These supporters are people who have not benefited from the political order established after the civil war, or from the new economic programme initiated by the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2006. Gang leaders argue that they are protecting the most vulnerable people of society from arbitrary abuse of public security forces, that politicians commit open corruption by stealing government funds, and that the economy benefits only a small elite. The gangs or maras, along with their civilian constituency, are tired of being ignored, and frustrated by the lack of assistance to relieve extreme poverty. In this essay, I examine the series of events that reveal how the former street gangs of the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio-18 (B-18, both factions, Sure~nos and Revolucionarios) have become political actors in El Salvador. Clearly, the implications of this transformation are key to understanding current events in that country; but more importantly, the politicization of the gangs has reshaped the context for accurately explaining why thousands of people have fled El Salvador and how their requests for asylum in the US and around the world should be understood. In addition to the US, large numbers of Salvadoran refugees have sought safety in Canada, Mexico, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Italy, and Australia. Much of this article is based on publicly available newspaper articles and institutional reports documenting social and political events in El Salvador. My goal has been to organize this material into a coherent, systematic analysis that reveals the changing nature of gang violence. In addition, research for this article includes interviews conducted in El Salvador with key representatives of human rights organizations, the National Academy of Public Security (ANSP), and government officials working on issues of gang-related violence. The ANSP supports a robust research and publishing programme through the Centro de Investigación Cientı́fica (CINC) and the Centre’s journal Revista Policı́a y Seguridad Pública (hereafter and in footnotes RPSP). My hope is that this article will highlight the outstanding work being done by the CINC and encourage broader use of their important journal. Finally, this article draws on a handful of asylum cases for which I have first-hand information. To maintain the anonymity of asylum 1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from El Salvador, Geneva, UNHCR, Mar. 2016, 12; S. Kinosian, A. Albaladejo & L. Haugaard, El Salvador’s Violence: No Easy Way Out, Center for International Policy, Latin American Working Group Education Fund, Washington, DC, Aug. 2016, 8. 2 The founding documents for the ANSP and CINC emphasized the importance of protecting the rights of citizens to exercise constitutional guarantees of free expression, association, and human rights. See El Salvador, Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública, “Proyecto: Centro de Investigación Cientı́fica de la Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (CINC–ANSP)”, RPSP, 5(2), 2015, 467–481. See also, W. Stanley, Risking Failure: The Problems and Promise of the New Civilian Police in El Salvador, Washington, DC, Washington Office on Latin America/Hemisphere Initiatives, 1993; W. Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1996. 2 Patrick J. McNamara j Political Refugees from El Salvador Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/36/4/1/4108107 by University of Minnesota Law Library user on 22 February 2018 applicants, I will use this information sparingly and generally without citations. Public information taken from newspapers and published reports will be clearly identified for others to use as appropriate. I demonstrate in this article that the gang factions in El Salvador began to coordinate joint anti-State operations after the collapse of a 2012–2014 truce with the Government. Their aspirations for creating a united supra-organization were revealed in 2015, although the reality of that organisation has generally failed to live up to the announced goals of the gangs. Still, the gangs have continued to cooperate with each other as they have shifted their objectives from simply earning money through criminal enterprises to becoming legitimate political actors in society. Civilian opposition and resistance to gang activities take place now in terms of the political orientation and goals of the gangs. As a result, I argue in this essay that most refugees from El Salvador have fled their homes because of political repression at the hands of the gangs, and the Government’s inability to adequately protect them. Refusing to pay extortion, refusing to join a gang, refusing to submit to sexual assault, and refusing to remain silent about crimes committed by the gangs should be understood in terms of this political context. I begin with a brief historical outline of the post-Civil War years in El Salvador when the entire security apparatus was re-organized and gang members began to locate in areas without a police presence. I then turn to the more recent past since 2014 and the politicisation process of the gangs. Intentional homicide rates increased dramatically in 2015 and early 2016, and the Government appeared unable to contain this wave of violence. I then discuss the evidence that shows how the Government’s inability to protect civilians demonstrates that El Salvador has become a failed state in terms of its primary responsibility. I conclude with an examination of how people fleeing violence in El Salvador should be considered political refugees as defined by US immigration courts and United Nations charters. 2 . F R O M C I V I L W A R T O G A N G W A R F A R E In the aftermath of a violent civil war in which more than 75,000 people were killed, and hundreds of thousands of people dislocated inside El Salvador and abroad, the warring parties agreed to re-make El Salvador according to new terms of cooperation and transparency. In addition to re-organizing the political process, allowing the FMLN to engage in electoral politics, the two sides agreed to completely overhaul the military and police forces. This focus on the security apparatus was key, as there would be no way to guarantee the safety of former militants on either side, or guarantee the broad participation of civilians in the reform efforts without new personnel and leadership within the police and armed forces. In general terms, military leaders agreed to use the armed forces to protect the country from foreign invasion; the new National Civilian Police (PNC) would be responsible for maintaining security within the country. Both branches of the national security forces began their reformation by adhering to a new philosophy that stressed the protection of human

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萨尔瓦多的政治难民：帮派政治、国家和庇护申请

自 2015 年夏天以来，驱使萨尔瓦多难民前往美国寻求庇护的社会条件发生了巨大变化。经过十多年的帮派战争和犯罪暴力，萨尔瓦多的马拉人已成为政治参与者。他们宣布成立一个新的超组织 Mara-503，并宣布他们打算塑造萨尔瓦多乃至整个中美洲地区的政治进程。因此，逃离萨尔瓦多暴力的人应被视为美国移民法庭和联合国宪章所定义的政治难民。本文基于在萨尔瓦多进行的研究，并作为萨尔瓦多难民案件的专家证人。它概述了“第三代”帮派组织的出现，萨尔瓦多社会秩序面临的威胁，以及移民律师在难民案件中应该采取的方法。关键词：萨尔瓦多，帮派，难民，私人保安 1 。导言 35 年来，萨尔瓦多通过暴力取得合法政治权力的途径。民族主义共和联盟 (ARENA) 始于 1980 年，最初是一个“敢死队”，由其创始人罗伯托·德奥比松 (Roberto D'Abuisson) 领导。根据人权报告和美国政府解密的文件，ARENA 暗杀了大主教奥斯卡·罗梅罗，此外还有数百起其他法外处决。Farabundo Martı́ 民族解放阵线 (FMLN) 最初是由五个独立的左翼组织组成的武装联盟，他们于 1980 年向萨尔瓦多政府宣战。 1992 年 1 月，经过超过 12 年的长期内战，ARENA 党主席 Alfredo Cristiani 领导下的政府与 FMLN 领导人签署了和平协议。该协议被称为查普尔特佩克和平协议，允许 FMLN 参与选举政治，并启动萨尔瓦多军队和警察部队的完全重组。* 明尼苏达大学历史系副教授，271 19 Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA。电子邮件：pjm@umn.edu VC 作者 [2017]。版权所有。如需许可，请发送电子邮件至：journals.permissions@oup.com 1 Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2017, 36, 1–24 doi: 10.1093/rsq/hdx011 Advance Access 出版日期：2017 年 9 月 8 日文章下载自 https://academic.oup . com/rsq/article-abstract/36/4/1/4108107 由明尼苏达大学法律图书馆用户于 2018 年 2 月 22 日发布 萨尔瓦多的黑帮今天正沿着一条众所周知的成功轨迹走向政治合法性，尽管他们有残酷的历史使这个目标显得幼稚和误导的暴力。事实上，ARENA 和 FMLN 政党之间长达数十年的竞争和敌意，为帮派更有效地进入政治体系创造了空间。官员们估计，多达 600,000 名家庭成员和盟友支持该团伙的一般策略和政治目标。这些支持者既没有从内战后建立的政治秩序中受益，也没有从 2006 年与美国的中美洲自由贸易协定发起的新经济计划中受益。帮派头目争辩说，他们是在保护社会中最弱势的人群免遭公共安全部队的任意滥用，政客通过窃取政府资金进行公开腐败，而且经济仅使少数精英受益。帮派或马拉斯以及他们的平民选民厌倦了被忽视，并因缺乏缓解极端贫困的援助而感到沮丧。在这篇文章中，我考察了一系列事件，这些事件揭示了 Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) 和 Barrio-18（B-18，两个派别，Sure~nos 和 Revolucionarios）的前街头帮派如何成为 El萨尔瓦多。显然，这种转变的含义是了解该国当前事件的关键；但更重要的是，帮派的政治化改变了背景，可以准确解释为什么成千上万的人逃离萨尔瓦多，以及应该如何理解他们在美国和世界各地的庇护请求。除美国外，大量萨尔瓦多难民前往加拿大、墨西哥、尼加拉瓜、哥斯达黎加、意大利和澳大利亚寻求安全。本文的大部分内容是基于公开的报纸文章和机构报告，记录了萨尔瓦多的社会和政治事件。我的目标是将这些材料组织成一个连贯、系统的分析，揭示帮派暴力不断变化的本质。此外，本文的研究包括在萨尔瓦多对人权组织的主要代表、国家公共安全学院 (ANSP)、和处理与帮派有关的暴力问题的政府官员。ANSP 通过 Centro de Investigación Cientı́fica (CINC) 和该中心的期刊 Revista Policı́a y Seguridad Pública（下文和脚注 RPSP）支持一项强有力的研究和出版计划。我希望这篇文章能够突出 CINC 所做的杰出工作，并鼓励更广泛地使用他们的重要期刊。最后，本文借鉴了我掌握第一手信息的少数庇护案件。保持庇护的匿名性 1 联合国难民事务高级专员 (UNHCR)，评估萨尔瓦多寻求庇护者国际保护需求的资格准则，日内瓦，难民署，2016 年 3 月，12；S. Kinosian、A. Albaladejo 和 L. Haugaard，萨尔瓦多的暴力：没有捷径可走，国际政策中心，拉丁美洲工作组教育基金，华盛顿特区，2016 年 8 月，8. 2 ANSP 和 CINC 的成立文件强调了保护公民行使宪法保障自由表达、结社、和人权。参见萨尔瓦多，Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública，“Proyecto：Centro de Investigación Cientı́fica de la Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (CINC–ANSP)”，RPSP，5(2)，2015，467–481。另见 W. Stanley，冒着失败的风险：萨尔瓦多新民警的问题和承诺，华盛顿特区，华盛顿拉丁美洲/半球倡议办公室，1993 年；W. Stanley, The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1996. 2 Patrick J. McNamara j来自萨尔瓦多的政治难民从 https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/36/4/1/4108107 下载，由明尼苏达大学法律图书馆用户于 2018 年 2 月 22 日申请，我将使用此信息很少和一般没有引用。从报纸和已发表的报告中获取的公共信息将被明确标识以供其他人酌情使用。我在本文中表明，在 2012-2014 年与政府的停火协议破裂后，萨尔瓦多的帮派派别开始协调联合反国家行动。他们创建一个统一的超组织的愿望在 2015 年被揭示，尽管该组织的现实通常未能实现帮派宣布的目标。仍然，这些团伙继续相互合作，将目标从单纯通过犯罪企业赚钱转变为成为社会上合法的政治行为者。民间对帮派活动的反对和抵制现在发生在帮派的政治取向和目标方面。因此，我在这篇文章中认为，大多数来自萨尔瓦多的难民逃离家园是因为团伙的政治镇压，以及政府无法充分保护他们。拒绝敲诈勒索、拒绝加入帮派、拒绝接受性侵犯、拒绝对帮派所犯罪行保持沉默，应该从这种政治背景下理解。我首先简要介绍内战后萨尔瓦多的历史概况，当时整个安全机构都进行了重组，帮派成员开始在没有警察存在的地区活动。然后我转向自 2014 年以来最近的过去以及帮派的政治化进程。2015 年和 2016 年初故意杀人率急剧上升，政府似乎无法遏制这波暴力浪潮。然后我讨论了表明政府无力保护平民如何表明萨尔瓦多在其主要责任方面已成为一个失败国家的证据。最后，我考察了在萨尔瓦多逃离暴力的人们如何被视为美国移民法庭和联合国宪章所定义的政治难民。2 . 来自CIVILWARTOGANGWAR FARE 在一场导致超过 75,000 人丧生、数十万人流离失所的内战之后，交战各方同意根据新的合作条款和透明度重建萨尔瓦多. 除了重新组织政治进程，允许民阵参与选举政治外，双方还同意彻底改革军队和警察部队。这种对安全机构的关注是关键，因为如果没有警察和武装部队中的新人员和领导层，就无法保证任何一方前激进分子的安全，也无法保证平民广泛参与改革努力。笼统，军事领导人同意动用武装力量保护国家免受外国入侵；新的国家民警（PNC）将负责维护国内的安全。国家安全部队的两个分支都通过坚持强调保护人类的新理念开始了改革。