We experimentally examine how information transmission functions in an ongoing relationship. Where the one-shot cheap-talk literature documents substantial overcommunication and preferences for honesty, the outcomes in our repeated setting are more consistent with uninformative babbling outcomes. This is particularly surprising, as honest revelation is supportable as an equilibrium outcome in our repeated setting. We show that inefficient outcomes are driven by a coordination failure on how to distribute the gains from information sharing. However, when agents can coordinate on the payment of an "information rent," honest revelation emerges.

中文翻译：

---

未来阴影下的信息传输：实验

我们通过实验研究了信息传输在持续关系中的运作方式。在一次性廉价谈话文献记录了大量的过度沟通和对诚实的偏好的情况下，我们重复设置的结果与无信息的胡言乱语的结果更一致。这尤其令人惊讶，因为在我们反复设置的情况下，诚实的启示可以作为均衡结果得到支持。我们表明，在如何分配信息共享收益方面的协调失败导致了低效的结果。然而，当代理人可以协调支付“信息租金”时，诚实的启示就会出现。