We study a principal-agent interaction where investments and rewards arrive stochastically over time and are privately observed by the agent. Investments (costly for the agent, beneficial for the principal) can be concealed by the agent. Rewards (beneficial for the agent, costly for the principal) can be forbidden by the principal. We ask how rewards should be used and which investments incentivized. We identify the unique optimal mechanism and analyze the dynamic investment and compensation policies. When all rewards are identical, the unique optimal way to provide incentives is by a “carte blanche” to pursue all rewards arriving in a predetermined time frame. (JEL D82, M52)

中文翻译：

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动态非货币激励

我们研究了委托代理交互，其中投资和奖励随时间随机到达，并由代理私下观察。投资（对代理人来说代价高昂，对委托人有利）可以被代理人隐瞒。奖励（对代理人有利，对委托人昂贵）可以被委托人禁止。我们询问应该如何使用奖励以及激励哪些投资。我们确定了独特的优化机制并分析了动态投资和补偿政策。当所有奖励都相同时，提供激励的独特最佳方式是通过“全权委托”来追求在预定时间范围内到达的所有奖励。(JEL D82, M52)