The literature initiated by Green and Laffont (1986) studies principal-agent models with hard evidence. Evidence is modeled by assuming that the message set of the agent is type dependent. In this setup, Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) and Sher (2011) show that when the agent's utility function is type independent there is no advantage for the principal in having commitment power. This paper shows that this way of modeling evidence implicitly assumes it to be perfectly accurate and that the result that commitment power has no value is not robust to making the evidence imperfect.

中文翻译：

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不完全证据博弈中承诺力的重要性

Green 和 Laffont (1986) 发起的文献研究了具有确凿证据的委托代理模型。证据是通过假设代理的消息集是类型相关的来建模的。在这种设置中，Glazer 和 Rubinstein (2004, 2006) 和 Sher (2011) 表明，当代理人的效用函数是类型无关的时，委托人在拥有承诺能力方面没有优势。本文表明，这种对证据建模的方式隐含地假设它是完全准确的，并且承诺力没有价值的结果对于使证据不完善来说并不稳健。