A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A key feature of banks is that they learn about project quality from bad news, i.e. a default. We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to increase with expected quality and imperfect information about quality. Results differ if managers instead learn from good news.

中文翻译：

---

尝试职业问题

如果认识到失败/不成功会损害他的声誉，那么随着时间的推移私下了解项目的经理可能希望推迟退出。在银行业，管理人员可能希望展期不良贷款。扭曲如何取决于预期的项目质量？发布有关质量的公共信息有什么影响？银行的一个关键特征是他们从坏消息（即违约）中了解项目质量。我们表明，在这样的环境中，失真往往会随着预期质量和关于质量的不完善信息而增加。如果管理者从好消息中学习，结果就会不同。