An entrepreneur finances her project with common value via crowdfunding. She chooses a funding mechanism (fixed or flexible), a price, and a funding goal. Under fixed funding money is refunded if the goal is not met; under flexible funding the entrepreneur keeps the money. Backers observe signals about the value and decide whether to contribute or postpone purchase to the retail stage. The optimal crowdfunding campaign is characterized. We show that fixed funding campaigns perform better than the flexible ones through an application of the linkage principle, we also show that third-party crowdfunding sites serves as a commitment device that the entrepreneur will use to eliminate moral hazard.

中文翻译：

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众筹经济学

一位企业家通过众筹为她的项目提供共同价值。她选择融资机制（固定或灵活）、价格和融资目标。如果未达到目标，则在固定资金下退还资金；在灵活的资金下，企业家保留资金。支持者观察有关价值的信号，并决定是否贡献或推迟购买到零售阶段。最优众筹活动的特点是。我们通过应用链接原则表明固定筹资活动比灵活筹资活动表现更好，我们还表明第三方众筹网站作为企业家用来消除道德风险的承诺工具。