Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We draw surprising policy implications, on the effect of group size, of supermajority rules and of the observability of actions.

中文翻译：

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当小组观看时投票和贡献

团体和组织的成员通常必须决定规则，以规范他们对共同任务的贡献。他们通常在贡献的倾向上有所不同，并且经常关心他们所投射的形象，特别是希望被其他小组成员视为高贡献者。在这种环境中，我们研究成员对规则进行投票的方式与其随后的贡献决定之间的相互作用。我们表明可以出现多种规范。我们对群体规模、绝对多数规则和行动的可观察性的影响得出了令人惊讶的政策含义。