We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player’s beliefs about the opponent's strategy and the actual strategy. Our equilibrium condition requires that: (1) each player choose a best-response strategy to his distorted belief about the opponent's strategy, and (2) the distortion functions form best responses to one another, in the sense that if one of the players is endowed with a different distortion function, then that player is outperformed in the game induced by this new distortion function. We impose a mild monotonicity restriction on the feasible biased beliefs, and we obtain sharp predictions and novel insights into the set of stable outcomes and their supporting stable biases in various classes of games.

中文翻译：

---

偏见信念平衡

我们调查扭曲但结构化的信念如何在战略情境中持续存在。具体而言，我们研究了两人博弈，其中每个玩家都被赋予了一个偏见信念函数，该函数代表了玩家对对手策略的信念与实际策略之间的差异。我们的均衡条件要求：（1）每个参与者针对他对对手策略的扭曲信念选择最佳响应策略，以及（2）扭曲函数形成对彼此的最佳响应，从某种意义上说，如果其中一个参与者是赋予不同的失真函数，那么该玩家在这个新的失真函数诱导的游戏中表现出色。我们对可行的有偏见的信念施加温和的单调性限制，