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Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
Games and Economic Behavior ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-10 , DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.001
Yi-Chun Chen , Takashi Kunimoto , Yifei Sun , Siyang Xiong

We prove that the Maskin monotonicity condition (proposed by Bergemann et al. (2011)) fully characterizes exact rationalizable implementation in an environment with lotteries and transfers. Different from previous papers, our approach possesses many appealing features simultaneously, e.g., finite mechanisms with no integer game or modulo game are used; no transfers are made in any rationalizable profile; the message space is small; the implementation is robust to information perturbations in the sense of Oury and Tercieux (2012).



中文翻译:

有限机制中的合理化实现

我们证明 Maskin 单调性条件(由 Bergemann 等人(2011 年)提出)完全表征了在具有彩票和转移的环境中精确合理的实现。与以前的论文不同,我们的方法同时具有许多吸引人的特征,例如,使用没有整数博弈或模博弈的有限机制;没有以任何合理化的方式进行转移;消息空间小;在 Oury 和 Tercieux (2012) 的意义上,该实现对信息扰动是稳健的。

更新日期:2021-06-17
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