Twofold effect of self-interest in pedestrian room evacuation,Physical Review E

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Twofold effect of self-interest in pedestrian room evacuation
Physical Review E ( IF 2.2 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-10 , DOI: 10.1103/physreve.103.062305
Ze-Hao Chen ₁ , Zhi-Xi Wu _{1,

2} , Jian-Yue Guan _{1,

2}

Affiliation

Evacuation dynamics of pedestrians in a square room with one exit is studied. The movement of the pedestrians is guided by the static floor field model. Whenever multiple pedestrians are trying to move to the same target position, a game theoretical framework is introduced to address the conflict. Depending on the payoff matrix, the game that the pedestrians are involved in may be either hawk-dove or prisoner's dilemma, from which the reaped payoffs determine the capacities, or probabilities, of the pedestrians occupying the preferred vacant sites. The pedestrians are allowed to adjust their strategies when competing with others, and a parameter

κ

is utilized to characterize the extent of their self-interest. It is found that self-interest may induce either positive or negative impacts on the evacuation dynamics depending on whether it can facilitate the formation of collective cooperation in the population or not. Particularly, a resonance-like performance of evacuation is realized in the regime of prisoner's dilemma. The effects of placing an obstacle in front of the exit and the diversity of responses of the pedestrians to the space competition on the evacuation dynamics are also discussed.

中文翻译：

行人房间疏散中自身利益的双重影响

研究了具有一个出口的方形房间中行人的疏散动态。行人的运动由静态地板场模型引导。每当多个行人试图移动到同一目标位置时，就会引入博弈论框架来解决冲突。根据收益矩阵，行人参与的博弈可能是鹰鸽或囚徒困境，从中获得的收益决定了行人占据首选空位的能力或概率。允许行人在与他人竞争时调整自己的策略，一个参数