ABSTRACT In this article, we shed light on the optimal design of Commission rules and practices for addressing interference disputes. Since spectrum licenses produce no benefits without large and mostly sunk investments in communications networks, our focus is on investment incentives. We argue that the regulator’s optimal interference policy would necessarily deal with different license holders differently when their sunk network investments vary. Our economic model dictates that license holders who have made little or no sunk investment in capital to generate benefits from their license would receive little relief under an optimal rule. On the other hand, those licensees with substantial sunk network investments would receive far more expansive treatment by the regulator.

中文翻译：

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干扰、沉没投资和无线电频谱的再利用

摘要 在本文中，我们阐明了解决干扰纠纷的委员会规则和实践的优化设计。如果没有对通信网络进行大量且大部分沉没的投资，频谱许可证就不会产生任何好处，因此我们的重点是投资激励措施。我们认为，当沉没网络投资不同时，监管机构的最佳干扰政策必然会以不同的方式处理不同的许可证持有者。我们的经济模型表明，在最佳规则下，很少或根本没有进行资本投资以从其许可证中产生收益的许可证持有人将获得很少的救济。另一方面，那些拥有大量沉没网络投资的被许可人将受到监管机构更广泛的待遇。