Abstract We show that managerial delegation based upon comparative performance may generate collusive outcomes observationally equivalent to those typically associated with repeated games or cross ownership. This happens when rivals’ profits are positively weighted in the managerial incentive scheme. We also identify the level of time discounting at which a repeated game based upon Nash reversion would achieve the same degree of collusion. Accordingly, such managerial contracts should attract the attention of antitrust authorities.

中文翻译：

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基于比较绩效的管理合同的共谋性质

摘要 我们表明，基于比较绩效的管理授权可能会产生合谋结果，观察结果与通常与重复博弈或交叉所有权相关的结果相同。当竞争对手的利润在管理激励计划中具有正权重时，就会发生这种情况。我们还确定了基于纳什回归的重复博弈将达到相同程度的共谋的时间折扣水平。因此，此类管理合同应引起反垄断当局的注意。