The defeat of Theresa May's Withdrawal Agreement in the British Parliament is often ascribed to the prime minister's precarious situation in Parliament and her inability to negotiate a deal that satisfied domestic stakeholders. But the contradictions of Brexit were always going to produce a least-worst agreement and patterns of support for the deal were largely invariant to changes in its contents. Drawing on the literature on ratification, this article sets out an alternative explanation for the demise of the Withdrawal Agreement. It argues that the government's ability to threaten MPs with a ‘no deal’ outcome placed the executive in a strong position following the referendum, and that the primary source of ratification failure was the breakdown of this ability over the course of the negotiations. This account helps us understand why the government was initially unwilling to seek the support of stakeholders outside of the Conservative Party for its Brexit proposals.

中文翻译：

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交易或不交易：Theresa May 的退出协议和（非）批准的政治

特蕾莎·梅的脱欧协议在英国议会的失败往往被归咎于首相在议会中的岌岌可危的处境，以及她无法通过谈判达成令国内利益相关者满意的协议。但英国退欧的矛盾总是会产生最差的协议，支持协议的模式在很大程度上不受其内容变化的影响。本文借鉴有关批准的文献，对退出协议的失效提出了另一种解释。它认为，政府以“无协议”结果威胁国会议员的能力使行政部门在公投后处于强势地位，批准失败的主要根源是这种能力在谈判过程中崩溃。