Our contribution demonstrates and explains the ineffectiveness of European Union (EU) bank resolution rules, a core element of Banking Union. This inadequacy owes in large part to the limited access to and insufficient availability of EU resolution funds and inadequate national deposit guarantee schemes in most EU member states, in conjunction with the relatively high minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for many EU banks. In many cases, these requirements are unlikely ever to be met – particularly for retail banks most likely to require resolution in the euro periphery. We offer a liberal intergovernmentalist analysis to explain the inadequacy of the EU resolution regime by examining German and French government preferences on EU rules on bank capital requirements agreed earlier in 2013 and national deposit guarantee schemes agreed in 2014. These government preferences were shaped significantly by the preferences of national banks and bank associations.

中文翻译：

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Stillborn Banking Union：解释无效的欧盟银行决议规则†

我们的贡献展示并解释了欧盟 (EU) 银行决议规则的无效性，这是银行业联盟的核心要素。这种不足在很大程度上是由于欧盟决议资金的获得有限和可用性不足以及大多数欧盟成员国的国家存款担保计划不足，以及许多欧盟对自有资金和合格负债（MREL）的相对较高的最低要求银行。在许多情况下，这些要求永远不可能得到满足——特别是对于最有可能要求解决欧元外围国家的零售银行而言。