Reviewed by:

• Hume, Passion, and Action by Elizabeth Radcliffe
• Katharina Paxman

It is a challenge to write a book on a topic that has received extensive treatment in philosophical discourse—especially when said treatment has been varied in purpose, angle, and aim. Hume’s work on the relationship between passion and action is one such topic. Scholarship on this theme has ranged from historically situated interpretive work, to theoretical work that assumes a Kantian foil, to the robust discourse of contemporary Humean views (which themselves vary widely in their resemblance to the historical Hume). In her book, Hume, Passion, and Action, Elizabeth Radcliffe has taken on the complex task of writing on motivation in Hume with many of these perspectives in her sights, and it has resulted in a book that clearly and helpfully walks us through the complexities and interrelations of these discourses, while simultaneously making a case for her own interpretive take on Hume’s theory of motivation. Such a labor is not for the faint of heart, and Radcliffe does an exceptional job of carefully and systematically presenting the various discussions. But the real pay-off comes as one engages Radcliffe’s own arguments. She provides the reader with several important innovations in approaching the topic of Humean motivation, including a new defense of Hume’s commitment to the motivational impotence of belief and a careful analysis of what Hume requires for the motivational efficacy of a passion. Radcliffe’s interpretive arguments will surely advance the discourse on Hume’s account of passion and action. Given their presentation alongside an incredibly helpful overview of the relevant debates, this text should be treated as essential reading to anyone looking to further contribute to these discussions.

Radcliffe positions herself as arguing for the “traditional reading” of Hume’s thesis concerning the impotence of reason to motivate: the assumption that neither reason considered as a process, nor its products, that is, beliefs, generate impulses to action. She starts by offering an analysis of which passions count as motives, and then offers an answer as to why only some passions motivate, arguing that a mental state that motivates must include a desire. This means, contrary to some interpretations, Hume finds his categories of direct and indirect passions to each include both motivating and non-motivating passions. She also emphasizes a third category of passion, “original” or natural instincts, which Hume identifies as kinds of general desires and “active principles.” Radcliffe describes these as dispositions “to acquire passions for particular objects” and “contribute to the formation of motivating passions” (55). [End Page 113]

She then moves to consider Hume’s arguments for the motivational impotence of reason, considering both a variety of recent interpretations and placing Hume’s arguments in their historical context. She concludes that this argument is meant to apply to both reason and belief. This conclusion is further supported by a close treatment of Hume’s account of belief, where she takes seriously Hume’s identification of belief as an idea set apart from non-believed ideas phenomenologically, but not itself an impression, and carrying no impulse. Passions, on the other hand, are non-representative “original existences,” and can generate impulses. She points to Hume’s emphasis on the inability of reason to provide a contrary impulse to the passions, meaning that (contrary to many early modern rationalist theorists) it is in no position to act as counsel to the will or moderator of the passions. She then uses Hume’s Book 3 argument against moral rationalism to further illustrate that Hume takes only passions to be potential motives. She makes the case that Hume must be read as a moral internalist, meaning that he finds “morality on its own motivates” (115). She argues that our passions-based moral distinctions can provide impulse for action even “when we lack the appropriate natural virtue” that would otherwise lead us to act morally (11). This treatment also includes an interesting argument for a Humean account in which it is possible for reason to help us form beliefs about the content of...

审核人：

• 伊丽莎白·雷德克里夫的休谟、激情和行动
• 凯瑟琳娜·帕克斯曼

写一本关于在哲学话语中得到广泛处理的主题的书是一项挑战——尤其是当所述处理在目的、角度和目标上有所不同时。休谟关于激情与行动之间关系的工作就是这样一个主题。关于这个主题的学术研究范围广泛，从历史定位的解释性工作，到假设康德主义的理论工作，再到当代休谟观点的有力论述（它们本身与历史休谟的相似性差异很大）。在她的书《休谟、激情和行动》中, 伊丽莎白·拉德克利夫 (Elizabeth Radcliffe) 承担了撰写休谟动机的复杂任务，她的视野中有许多这些观点，这导致了这本书清晰而有益地引导我们了解这些话语的复杂性和相互关系，同时做出她自己对休谟动机理论的解释。这样的工作不适合胆小的人，拉德克利夫在仔细和系统地呈现各种讨论方面做得非常出色。但真正的回报来自于拉德克利夫自己的论点。她为读者提供了接​​近休谟动机这一主题的几项重要创新，包括对休谟对信念的动机无能的承诺的新辩护，以及对休谟对激情的动机效力的要求的仔细分析。拉德克利夫的解释性论证肯定会推进关于休谟关于激情和行动的论述的论述。鉴于他们的介绍以及对相关辩论的非常有用的概述，对于希望进一步为这些讨论做出贡献的任何人来说，本文应该被视为必不可少的读物。

拉德克利夫将自己定位为支持休谟关于理性无法激发动力的论文的“传统解读”：假设理性既不是一个过程，也不是它的产物，即信念，都不会产生行动的冲动。她首先分析了哪些激情可以算作动机，然后回答为什么只有某些激情才能激发，认为激发动力的心理状态必须包括欲望。这意味着，与某些解释相反，休谟发现他的直接和间接激情的类别包括激励和非激励激情。她还强调了第三类激情，即“原始”或自然本能，休谟将其视为一种普遍的欲望和“积极的原则”。[第113页结束]

然后，她开始考虑休谟关于理性的动机无能的论点，同时考虑各种最近的解释并将休谟的论点置于其历史背景中。她的结论是，这个论点既适用于理性，也适用于信仰。这一结论得到了对休谟对信仰的详细描述的进一步支持，她认真对待休谟对信仰的认同，即在现象学上将信仰与非信仰观念区分开来，但它本身并不是一种印象，并且没有任何冲动。另一方面，激情是不具有代表性的“原始存在”，可以产生冲动。她指出休谟强调理性无法为激情提供相反的冲动，这意味着（与许多早期现代理性主义理论家相反）它无法充当意志的顾问或激情的调节器。然后，她使用休谟的第 3 卷反对道德理性主义的论点进一步说明休谟只将激情视为潜在的动机。她认为休谟必须被解读为道德内在主义者，这意味着他发现“道德出于自身的动机”（115）。她认为，即使“当我们缺乏适当的自然美德”时，我们基于激情的道德区别也可以提供行动冲动，否则会导致我们采取道德行动（11）。这种处理方法还包括一个关于休谟式解释的有趣论证，其中有理由帮助我们形成关于……的内容的信念。