Reviewed by:

• Hume on Art, Emotion, and Superstition: A Critical Study of the Four Dissertations by Amyas Merivale
• Alison McIntyre

Book 1 of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature (T) was reshaped into the first Enquiry, while the second Enquiry further develops some themes from Book 3. What became of Book 2, “Of the Passions” (T2)? Did Hume never extend his thinking in that area? Amyas Merivale notes that the standard answer to that question is that Hume did not do much in the way of rethinking T2 beyond selecting a few passages to excerpt, almost verbatim, in his “Dissertation on the Passions.” In this fine, wide-ranging, scrupulously researched and carefully argued book, Merivale offers a more intriguing and satisfying answer: the essays collected in the Four Dissertations (FD), “The Natural History of Religion” (NHR), “Of the Passions” (DP), “Of Tragedy” (TR), and “Of the Standard of Taste” (ST) constitute Hume’s mature philosophy of the passions. The thesis is not that the FD constitutes a thorough reworking of T2 material, rather that it displays some specific further developments in Hume’s thinking about the passions that draw on elements in the Treatise accounts.

The first two chapters of Part I provide the textual and historical context for Hume’s views on the passions. This makes for stimulating reading; it is rich in references to other figures in the period, provides insightful summaries of their positions, and advances many extremely compelling interpretive claims. Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler receive detailed attention. It is worth studying on its own as a freestanding commentary on the particular Treatise passages it discusses, and on the 17th- and 18th-century conversations to which Hume was responding.

Chapters 3 and 4 of Part I describe what Merivale takes to be the single most important change in Hume’s account of the passions. He argues that Hume was a psychological hedonist and egoist, influenced by Hobbes, Locke and Mandeville, when he wrote T2. “Shortly afterwards, however, he read and was persuaded by Butler’s anti-egoist arguments, and consequently became one of the clearest and keenest opponents of his own earlier view” (3). Merivale argues that T 2.3.9.8, which he dubs “the Butler paragraph,” shows Hume blatantly contradicting the account of the passions that had preceded it. [End Page 117]

Beside good and evil, or in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections.

(T 2.3.9.8; SBN 43)

Merivale suggests that this paragraph might be a late addition to the manuscript of the Treatise that indicates the influence of Butler’s anti-hedonist and anti-egoist arguments in Sermon 11, “Upon the Love of Our Neighbor—Rom. xiii. 9.” This influence is allegedly carried over to the DP, which displays a rejection of the hedonism and egoism of the T, as Hume embraces the motivational pluralism defended by Butler. Each of these claims is certain to be controversial.

Merivale’s discussion introduces important questions about how best to characterize and classify the views on motivation of Hume’s antecedents, Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler, as well as Malebranche, Clarke, and Wollaston, and to what degree Hume follows, adapts, or opposes their views.

The “Butler paragraph” introduces a distinction between two kinds of passions, those that proceed from, or arise from, good and evil, and those that arise from a natural impulse or instinct and produce good and evil. The first two paragraphs of the DP gracefully combine them, so it is not clear that Hume felt that this...

审核人：

• 休谟论艺术、情感和迷信：对阿米亚斯·梅里维尔 (Amyas Merivale)的四篇论文的批判性研究
• 艾莉森·麦金太尔

休谟的《人性论》 (T) 的第 1 卷被改造成第一个调查，而第二个调查进一步发展了第 3 卷的一些主题。第 2 卷“激情”(T2) 变成了什么？休谟从来没有在那个领域扩展他的思想吗？Amyas Merivale 指出，这个问题的标准答案是，休谟在他的“关于激情的论文”中，除了选择几段几乎逐字摘录的段落之外，并没有在重新思考 T2 方面做太多事情。在这本精美、范围广泛、经过仔细研究和仔细论证的书中，梅里维尔提供了一个更有趣和更令人满意的答案：四篇论文中收集的论文（FD）、《宗教自然史》（NHR）、《激情论》（DP）、《悲剧论》（TR）和《品味标准》（ST）构成了休谟成熟的激情哲学. 这篇论文并不是说 FD 构成了对 T2 材料的彻底改造，而是它展示了休谟关于利用论文叙述中的元素的激情的思想的一些具体的进一步发展。

第一部分的前两章为休谟关于激情的观点提供了文本和历史背景。这有助于激发阅读；它大量引用了这一时期的其他人物，对他们的立场进行了富有洞察力的总结，并提出了许多极具说服力的解释性主张。洛克、沙夫茨伯里、曼德维尔、哈奇森和巴特勒受到了详细的关注。作为对其所讨论的特定论文段落以及休谟所回应的 17 和 18 世纪对话的独立评论，它本身就值得研究。

第一部分的第 3 章和第 4 章描述了梅里维尔认为休谟对激情的描述中最重要的变化。他认为休谟是一个心理享乐主义者和利己主义者，在他写 T2 时受到霍布斯、洛克和曼德维尔的影响。“然而，不久之后，他阅读了巴特勒的反自我主义论点并被其说服，因此成为他自己早期观点最明确和最强烈的反对者之一”（3）。Merivale 认为，他称之为“巴特勒段落”的 T 2.3.9.8 表明休谟公然反驳了对其之前的激情的描述。[第117页结束]

除了善与恶，或者换句话说，痛苦和快乐之外，直接的激情常常来自一种完全无法解释的自然冲动或本能。惩罚我们的敌人，希望我们的朋友幸福，就是这种渴望；饥饿、欲望和其他一些身体上的欲望。正确地说，这些情欲产生善恶，不像其他情感那样从善恶产生。

（T 2.3.9.8；SBN 43）

Merivale 认为，这一段可能是论文手稿的后期补充，表明巴特勒在第 11 章“关于邻舍的爱——罗马书”中反享乐主义和反利己主义论点的影响。十三、9。” 据称，这种影响被延续到了 DP，显示了对 T 的享乐主义和利己主义的拒绝，因为休谟接受了巴特勒所捍卫的动机多元化。这些说法中的每一个肯定都会引起争议。

Merivale 的讨论引入了一些重要问题，即如何最好地描述和分类休谟的先行者 Locke、Shaftesbury、Mandeville、Hutcheson 和 Butler 以及 Malbranche、Clarke 和 Wollaston 的动机观点，以及休谟在何种程度上遵循、适应、或反对他们的意见。

该“巴特勒款”介绍了两种激情，那些之间的区别，从出发，还是从产生，善良与邪恶，和那些从自然的冲动或本能，并出现生产善恶。DP的前两段将它们优雅地结合在一起，所以不清楚休谟觉得这……