We quantify the welfare effects of cash suppression policies within a general equilibrium model where cash reduces transactions costs and aids tax evasion in underground markets. In the model, currency suppression increases transactions costs and raises effective tax rates, but shifts resources out of costly underground markets and relaxes the government budget. When coupled with a reduction in distortionary taxes on consumption or factor inputs to ensure budget neutrality, cash suppression policies increase welfare in our baseline representative agent model. In a model with individual heterogeneity in cash use, suppression increases welfare for all, but by less for cash-intensive users.

我们在一般均衡模型中量化了现金抑制政策的福利效应，其中现金降低了交易成本并有助于地下市场的逃税。在该模型中，货币抑制增加了交易成本并提高了有效税率，但将资源从昂贵的地下市场转移出来并放松了政府预算。再加上减少对消费或要素投入的扭曲性税收以确保预算中性，现金抑制政策会增加我们基准代理模型中的福利。在现金使用的个体异质性模型中，抑制增加了所有人的福利，但减少了现金密集型用户的福利。