ABSTRACT

I argue that traditional views on which beliefs are subject only to purely epistemic assessment can reject demographic profiling, even when based on seemingly robust evidence. This is because the moral failures involved in demographic profiling can be located in the decision not to suspend judgment, rather than supposing that beliefs themselves are a locus of moral evaluation. A key moral reason to suspend judgment when faced with adverse demographic evidence is to promote social equality—this explains why positive profiling is dubious, along with more familiar cases of negative profiling, and why profiling is suspect even when no particular action is at stake. My suspension-based view, while compatible with revisionary normative positions, does not presuppose them. Philosophers of all stripes can reject demographic profiling both in thought and deed.

摘要

我认为，关于哪些信念仅受纯粹认知评估影响的传统观点可以拒绝人口统计分析，即使基于看似强有力的证据也是如此。这是因为人口统计分析中涉及的道德失败可以定位于不暂停判断的决定，而不是假设信念本身是一个轨迹的道德评价。在面对不利的人口统计证据时暂停判断的一个关键道德原因是为了促进社会平等——这解释了为什么正面形象化是可疑的，以及更常见的负面形象化案例，以及为什么即使没有特定行动处于危险之中，形象化也是可疑的。我基于暂停的观点虽然与修订规范立场兼容，但并不预设它们。各行各业的哲学家都可以在思想和行动上拒绝人口统计。