ABSTRACT

Despite a growing literature on environmental inaction, it remains poorly understood. This article examines much of this literature including environmental ethics, policy studies, disaster theory, and psychology. Among the many existing explanations, we examine shifting values, rational incentives, and psychological barriers to action. Ultimately, we show how most of these explanations rely on simplistic assumptions about subjectivity. To address this, we apply the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to show how an understanding of habit informed by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology reveals the deeper conditions of both action and inaction.

摘要

尽管关于环境不作为的文献越来越多，但人们对其知之甚少。本文研究了这些文献的大部分内容，包括环境伦理、政策研究、灾害理论和心理学。在许多现有的解释中，我们研究了不断变化的价值观、理性激励和行动的心理障碍。最终，我们展示了这些解释中的大多数如何依赖于关于主观性的简单假设。为了解决这个问题，我们应用莫里斯·梅洛-庞蒂的现象学来展示根据梅洛-庞蒂的现象学对习惯的理解如何揭示作为和不作为的更深层次的条件。