A reliable smart grid should possess the necessary security mechanism against any attack aiming at disrupting the electricity market operation. The operation is performed to allocate the final nodal price as per the states estimated in each node. The state estimator can be misdirected by changing the network configuration both at physical and/or information layer, leading to disruption in the market operation. As compared to the physical attack or cyber attack carried out independently, a coordinated cyber-physical attack has a larger impact on the market operation. This article proposes a coordinated cyber-physical attack to maximize the electricity market disruption in terms of deviation in the generation cost between the day-ahead market and real-time market operations. The identification of physical attack causing maximum unintended deviation in the electricity market operation has been formulated as a binary optimization problem. The second stage of the proposed attack involves injecting a state preserving attack vector into the communication channel. The false data injection hides the impact of the physical attack, thereby, refraining the control center from taking necessary actions. The impact of the attack has been quantified in terms of variation in the generation cost and nodal prices between the preattack and postattack scenarios for IEEE 9, 14, and 39-bus power systems.

中文翻译：

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基于二值优化的协调网络物理攻击，用于扰乱电力市场运行


可靠的智能电网应具备必要的安全机制，抵御任何旨在扰乱电力市场运行的攻击。执行该操作以根据每个节点中估计的状态分配最终节点价格。通过改变物理层和/或信息层的网络配置，状态估计器可能会被误导，从而导致市场运行中断。与单独进行的物理攻击或网络攻击相比，协同的网络物理攻击对市场运行的影响更大。本文提出了一种协调的网络物理攻击，以根据日前市场和实时市场运行之间的发电成本偏差来最大限度地破坏电力市场。导致电力市场运行中最大意外偏差的物理攻击的识别已被表述为二元优化问题。所提出的攻击的第二阶段涉及将状态保存攻击向量注入通信通道。虚假数据注入隐藏了物理攻击的影响，从而阻止控制中心采取必要的行动。攻击的影响已根据 IEEE 9、14 和 39 总线电力系统攻击前和攻击后场景之间的发电成本和节点价格的变化进行了量化。