When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigates firms for financial fraud, investors learn about the investigation only if managers disclose it, or regulators sanction the firm. We investigate the effects of such disclosures using confidential records on all investigations, regardless of outcome. Even when no charges are brought, firms that voluntarily disclose an investigation underperform non-disclosing firms by 11.7 percent over the following year. Disclosure is associated with a higher chance of shareholder class action lawsuits, and more prominent disclosures are associated with worse returns. CEOs who disclose an investigation are 14 percent more likely to experience turnover. Our results are consistent with transparency about bad news being punished by financial and labor markets.

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“无罪”和“无罪”一样吗？来自美国证券交易委员会金融欺诈调查的证据

当美国证券交易委员会 (SEC) 调查公司的财务欺诈行为时，只有在经理披露或监管机构制裁公司的情况下，投资者才会了解调查。我们使用机密记录调查此类披露对所有调查的影响，无论结果如何。即使没有提出指控，自愿披露调查的公司在接下来的一年中的表现也比不披露公司低 11.7%。披露与股东集体诉讼的可能性更高有关，而更突出的披露与更差的回报有关。披露调查的 CEO 发生离职的可能性要高 14%。我们的结果与金融和劳动力市场惩罚坏消息的透明度一致。