To effectively protect critical infrastructure, it is essential to identify vulnerable areas for priority protection. The use of geographic information systems has increased over the last few decades for crime activity and the identification of delinquency hotspots. This study analyzes the areas of a power grid that are exposed to a higher than the average risk of terrorist attacks. One of the concerns for operation managers and policy makers is that subversive groups may have “inside” information to perform the attacks and create a critical failure that puts more pressure on the operational condition of the power grid. We use exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA) and information from the Colombian power grid to prompt the question: why hotspots emerge in some parts of the power grid, but not in others? The theoretical framework of attacks in the power grid operation exists but need to be corroborated with historical events that reflect such possible way of action. To this end, we perform a Getis-Ord Gi* hotspot analysis to direct attention to areas that are both under attack and critical in terms of operational risks that could affect the reliability and provision of critical services such as power generation and distribution. This subnational case study of Colombia uses data from XM and InterColombia (managers and operators of the Colombian power grid) to identify the areas of electrical infrastructure that have been most attacked and explain the motivations at the local level that the subversive groups have had to attack these areas.

为了有效保护关键基础设施，必须确定优先保护的脆弱区域。在过去的几十年中，地理信息系统在犯罪活动和犯罪热点识别方面的使用有所增加。本研究分析了遭受恐怖袭击风险高于平均风险的电网区域。运营经理和政策制定者的担忧之一是，颠覆组织可能拥有“内部”信息来执行攻击并造成严重故障，从而给电网的运行状况带来更大压力。我们使用探索性空间数据分析 (ESDA) 和来自哥伦比亚电网的信息来提示这个问题：为什么电网的某些部分会出现热点，但不是在其他人？电网运行中攻击的理论框架存在，但需要用反映这种可能的行动方式的历史事件来证实。为此，我们执行 Getis-Ord Gi* 热点分析，以将注意力集中在受攻击和运营风险方面的关键区域，这些区域可能会影响发电和配电等关键服务的可靠性和提供。哥伦比亚的这个地方案例研究使用来自 XM 和 InterColombia（哥伦比亚电网的管理者和运营商）的数据来确定受攻击最严重的电力基础设施区域，并解释了当地颠覆团体必须攻击的动机这些领域。