How does the presence of military officers in national government affect a state's likelihood of international conflict? We know a great deal about how overall regime type affects international conflict, but there is substantial variation within regime types in the participation of military officers in the government. We know little about how this variation affects a state's conflict propensity. In this Research Note, I examine three competing arguments for the effect of military participation in government on conflict initiation: Military Aggression, Military Conservatism, and Civil–Military Competition. Military Aggression suggests that military involvement in government will tend to guide the state toward conflict, given a military predisposition to favor the use of force. In contrast, Military Conservatism argues that military officers in government will lead the state to less conflict, given their personal familiarity with its costs. Civil–Military Competition holds that when military officers and civilians share political power, a variety of pathologies in national security deliberation and decision-making emerge, increasing conflict propensity. I test these three propositions cross-nationally using data on the number and type of positions held by military officers in cabinets and state councils and international conflict and find the strongest support for Civil–Military Competition.

中文翻译：

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内阁中的将军：军队参与政府和国际冲突的挑起

军官在国家政府中的存在如何影响一个国家发生国际冲突的可能性？我们非常了解整体政权类型如何影响国际冲突，但在军事官员参与政府方面，政权类型之间存在很大差异。我们对这种变化如何影响一个国家的冲突倾向知之甚少。在本研究报告中，我研究了关于军队参与政府对冲突引发的影响的三个相互竞争的论点：军事侵略、军事保守主义和军民竞争。军事侵略表明，军事参与政府往往会引导国家走向冲突，因为军事倾向倾向于使用武力。相比之下，军事保守主义认为，政府中的军官将带领国家减少冲突，因为他们个人熟悉其成本。军民竞争认为，当军官和平民共享政治权力时，国家安全审议和决策中会出现各种病态，增加冲突倾向。我使用有关军官在内阁和国务院和国际冲突中担任职位的数量和类型的数据对这三个命题进行了跨国测试，并找到了对军民竞争的最强支持。国家安全审议和决策中出现了各种病态，增加了冲突的倾向。我使用有关军官在内阁和国务院和国际冲突中担任职位的数量和类型的数据对这三个命题进行了跨国测试，并找到了对军民竞争的最强支持。国家安全审议和决策中出现了各种病态，增加了冲突的倾向。我使用有关军官在内阁和国务院和国际冲突中担任职位的数量和类型的数据对这三个命题进行了跨国测试，并找到了对军民竞争的最强支持。