Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.

中文翻译：

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坚持然后胡萝卜：内战期间政府何时给予大赦？

政府在内战期间大赦叛乱团体，这是一个谜。为什么政府会提供特赦，这可以解释为软弱的信号？在某些情况下，提供大赦是一种理性的政策选择。政府应在获胜时给予大赦：信号被误解的风险降低，成本低，反叛团体被削弱，因此大赦可被用来鼓励步兵叛逃或分裂，或作为对领导人的激励。因此，政府利用其军事优势，采取“大棒后胡萝卜”的策略进行特赦。使用 1990 年至 2011 年冲突期间的特赦数据库，该文章表明，政府更有可能在叛军死亡人数众多后给予特赦。