This paper explores the impact of banking regulation on a competitive credit market with ex-ante asymmetric information and aggregate uncertainty. I construct a model where the government imposes a regulatory constraint that limits the losses banks make in the event of their default. I show that the addition of banking regulation results in three deviations from the standard theory. First, collateral is demanded of both high and low risk firms, even in the absence of asymmetric information. Second, if banking regulation is sufficiently strict, there may not exist an adverse selection problem. Third, a pooling Nash equilibrium can exist.

中文翻译：

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信息不对称模型中的银行监管和抵押品筛选

本文探讨了银行监管对具有事前信息不对称和总体不确定性的竞争性信贷市场的影响。我构建了一个模型，其中政府施加监管约束以限制银行在违约时造成的损失。我表明银行监管的加入导致了与标准理论的三个偏差。首先，即使在信息不对称的情况下，高风险和低风险公司都需要抵押品。其次，如果银行业监管足够严格，可能不存在逆向选择问题。第三，可能存在合并纳什均衡。