Inspired by the increasing cause marketing (CM) practices of business firms, this paper investigates an e-tailer's incentives to share demand information with its supplier who may implement a CM campaign. Two different selling modes, agency selling and reselling, are examined. Although most previous studies suggest that a retailer should withhold its private demand observations to maintain an information advantage over the supplier, we find that CM may be a driving factor which motivates the e-tailer to share demand information with its supplier under certain conditions. Specifically, when the CM implementation cost is small or large, the e-tailer would like to share demand information under agency selling mode while keeping information private under reselling mode. When the CM implementation cost is intermediate, the consumer's prosociality level is high and information uncertainty is small, the e-tailer misleads (incentives) the supplier to implement CM by withholding (sharing) information under the agency selling (reselling) mode; otherwise, the e-tailer prefers to share (withhold) information under the agency selling (reselling) mode.

受商业公司日益增长的公益营销 (CM) 实践的启发，本文调查了电子零售商与可能实施​​ CM 活动的供应商共享需求信息的动机。考察了两种不同的销售模式，代理销售和转售。尽管大多数先前的研究表明零售商应该保留其私人需求观察以保持对供应商的信息优势，但我们发现 CM 可能是促使电子零售商在某些条件下与其供应商共享需求信息的驱动因素。具体而言，当CM实施成本或大或小时，网络零售商希望在代理销售模式下共享需求信息，而在转售模式下保持信息私密性。当 CM 实施成本处于中等水平时，消费者' 亲社会性水平高，信息不确定性小，网络零售商在代销（转售）模式下通过隐瞒（共享）信息误导（激励）供应商实施CM；否则，网络零售商更倾向于在代理销售（转售）模式下共享（隐瞒）信息。