Quality improvement and price-matching are two commonly used competing strategies by the retailers. However, it is still unclear how the retailers should deliberate over the two strategies when selling in both online and offline markets. In this paper, we consider two dual-channel retailers selling a substitutable product to consumers in both online and offline markets. Especially, the retailers compete in the online market, and their offline markets are exclusive to themselves. We establish a game-theoretical model to investigate the trade-off between quality improvement and price-matching in competition, and the impact on retailers' profits and consumer surplus in the dual-channel market structure. The analysis shows that, first, a retailer should choose to improve its quality to avoid price competition when the online market is small; second, when retailers engage in price competition, the retailer with larger offline market is more willing to adopt price-matching, while the retailer with a small share of offline market can be hurt; third, quality improvement can always increase the consumer surplus, while price-matching always hurts consumer surplus due to price collusion.

质量提升和价格匹配是零售商常用的两种竞争策略。然而，目前尚不清楚零售商在线上和线下市场销售时应如何考虑这两种策略。在本文中，我们考虑了两家双渠道零售商在线上和离线市场上向消费者销售可替代产品。尤其是零售商在线上市场竞争，而他们的线下市场是自己独有的。我们建立了一个博弈论模型来研究竞争中质量改进和价格匹配之间的权衡，以及在双渠道市场结构中对零售商利润和消费者剩余的影响。分析表明，首先，在网络市场规模较小的情况下，零售商应选择提高质量，避免价格竞争；第二，当零售商进行价格竞争时，线下市场较大的零售商更愿意采取价格匹配，而线下市场份额较小的零售商可能会受到伤害；第三，质量提升总是会增加消费者剩余，而价格匹配总是会因为价格勾结而伤害消费者剩余。