We use a threshold-based design to study ex post discretion in lenders’ contractual enforcement of covenant violations. At preset thresholds, lenders enforce contractual breaches only infrequently, but this enforcement is associated with material consequences (e.g., fees and renegotiations). Enforcement varies significantly over time and peaks when credit conditions are tightest, indicating that enforcement is procyclical. Costly coordination reduces enforcement: Syndicates with ex ante restrictive voting requirements enforce at lower rates. Consistent with theories of lender competition and implicit contracting, enforcement rates are lower for borrowers with access to alternative sources of financing and well-reputed lead arrangers.

中文翻译：

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贷方宽容

我们使用基于阈值的设计来研究贷方违反契约的合同执行中的事后自由裁量权。在预设的阈值下，贷方很少执行违反合同的行为，但这种执行会带来重大后果（例如，费用和重新谈判）。执行情况随时间变化很大，并在信贷条件最紧时达到峰值，这表明执行是顺周期性的。昂贵的协调减少了执行：具有事前限制性投票要求的辛迪加以较低的比率执行。与贷方竞争和隐性合同的理论一致，对于能够获得替代融资来源和知名牵头安排人的借款人，执行率较低。