In an equilibrium framework, we explore how players communicate in games with multiple Nash equilibria when messages that make sense are not ignored. Communication is about strategies and not about private information. It begins with the choice of a language, followed by a message that is allowed to be vague. We focus on equilibria where the sender is believed whenever possible, and develop a theory of credible communication. We show that credible communication is sensitive to changes in the timing of communication. Sufficient conditions for communication leading to efficient play are provided.

中文翻译：

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可信时相信：谈论未来的意图和过去的行动

在均衡框架中，我们探索了当有意义的消息不被忽略时，玩家如何在具有多个纳什均衡的游戏中进行交流。沟通是关于策略而不是关于私人信息。它从语言的选择开始，然后是允许含糊不清的信息。我们专注于尽可能相信发送者的均衡，并开发了可信通信理论。我们表明，可靠的沟通对沟通时间的变化很敏感。提供了充分的沟通条件，从而实现了高效的游戏。