ABSTRACT

The Normative Competence Account characterizes acting for a normative reason as action which manifests the agent’s complex normative competence. But which role does the correspondence between the normative reason and the agent’s motivating reason play and how is correspondence to be understood in this context? In this response, I argue that correspondence is to be understood merely as an interesting by-product of manifesting normative competence, namely as a representational relation between a proposition believed by the agent and it’s truth maker (i.e. the fact that is the normative reason acted for). In this response, I will answer further questions about this relation of correspondence, such as whether it can be described in more substantial terms and whether the representation of the normative reason has to meet further conditions to play it’s role in the manifestation of competence.

摘要

规范能力账户将出于规范原因的行为描述为表现代理人复杂规范能力的行为。但是对应哪个角色规范理性和行动者的激励理性之间的关系，以及在这种情况下如何理解对应？在这个回应中，我认为对应应仅被理解为表现规范能力的有趣副产品，即作为代理人相信的命题与其真理制造者之间的表征关系（即作为规范理性行动的事实）为了）。在这个回应中，我将回答关于这种对应关系的进一步问题，例如它是否可以用更实质的术语来描述，规范理性的表征是否必须满足进一步的条件才能在能力的表现中发挥作用。