This paper aims to explore various possibilities in the evolving global gas market by constructing game-theoretical models involving the major players: Russia and Qatar exporting gas to the Asia-Pacific and Europe, respectively. We explore a series of hypothetical scenarios based on competitive and collusive settings for the Asia-Pacific LNG market and based on Qatar’s export route to the European gas market. The scenarios that are examined are (1) Russia as the follower and Qatar as the leader in a Stackelberg game; (2) Russia and Qatar as Cournot competitors; (3) collaboration between Russia and Qatar as bilateral monopolies; (4) Qatar exporting gas to European borders; (5) Qatar exporting gas to the last transit country; and (6) Qatar transporting gas to the Turkish border under a multi-pricing scheme. Demand is estimated under each scenario to simulate the respective export volumes, prices and quantities, and profit in each scenario. By exploring these market interactions, we find that it is essential for Russia to strike a deal with Qatar in the Asian market and accelerate their gas production in order to compete as an LNG market leader. Russia is likely to benefit more if it can link with Qatar to act as a monopoly on their segmental demand curve. On the other hand, Qatar’s profit is expected to be higher under the scenario when Qatar sells all the gas to the last transit country as the sole demand point instead of passing through transit countries.

本文旨在通过构建涉及主要参与者的博弈论模型来探索不断发展的全球天然气市场的各种可能性：分别向亚太地区和欧洲出口天然气的俄罗斯和卡塔尔。我们基于亚太液化天然气市场的竞争和共谋环境以及卡塔尔向欧洲天然气市场的出口路线探索了一系列假设情景。所研究的场景是 (1) 在 Stackelberg 博弈中，俄罗斯作为跟随者，卡塔尔作为领导者；(2) 俄罗斯和卡塔尔作为古诺竞争者；(3) 俄罗斯与卡塔尔作为双边垄断的合作；(4) 卡塔尔向欧洲边境出口天然气；(5) 卡塔尔向最后一个过境国出口天然气；(6) 卡塔尔根据多重定价机制向土耳其边境输送天然气。估算每个情景下的需求，以模拟每个情景下各自的出口量、价格和数量以及利润。通过探索这些市场互动，我们发现俄罗斯必须在亚洲市场与卡塔尔达成协议并加快其天然气生产，以作为液化天然气市场领导者参与竞争。如果俄罗斯能够与卡塔尔联系起来垄断其细分需求曲线，俄罗斯可能会受益更多。另一方面，在卡塔尔将天然气全部销售给最后一个中转国作为唯一需求点而不是经过中转国的情况下，卡塔尔的利润有望更高。我们发现俄罗斯必须在亚洲市场与卡塔尔达成协议并加快其天然气生产，以作为液化天然气市场领导者参与竞争。如果俄罗斯能够与卡塔尔联系起来垄断其细分需求曲线，俄罗斯可能会受益更多。另一方面，在卡塔尔将天然气全部销售给最后一个中转国作为唯一需求点而不是经过中转国的情况下，卡塔尔的利润有望更高。我们发现俄罗斯必须在亚洲市场与卡塔尔达成协议并加快其天然气生产，以作为液化天然气市场领导者参与竞争。如果俄罗斯能够与卡塔尔联系起来垄断其细分需求曲线，俄罗斯可能会受益更多。另一方面，在卡塔尔将天然气全部销售给最后一个中转国作为唯一需求点而不是经过中转国的情况下，卡塔尔的利润有望更高。