One of the most widely-discussed arguments against physcialism appeals to the conceivability of zombies, being which are physically or functionally identical to humans but which have no conscious experiences. Philip Goff (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(1): 119–139, 2010; Consci Cognit 21(2): 742–746, 2012a; in Sprevak M, Kallestrup J (eds) New waves in philosophy of mind. Palgrave, 2014) has recently presented a number of different anti-physicalist arguments appealing to the conceivability of ghosts, entities whose nature is exhausted by their being conscious. If ghosts are conceivable, this would rule out a priori physicalism. If the conceivability of ghosts entails that they are metaphysically possible, then this forms the basis for arguments against a posteriori physicalism. Drawing on work on conceivability by Peter Kung (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(3):620–663, 2010, Noûs 50(1): 90–120, 2016) and my own discussion of arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies (O’Conaill in Mihretu P Guta (ed) Consciousness and the ontology of properties. Routledge, New York, 2019), I shall argue that ghosts are conceivable, but that what allows us to conceive of them (our ability to make certain stipulations about the scenarios we conceive) undermines the belief that conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility. While this does not undermine Goff’s argument against a priori phyiscalism, it suggests that a posteriori physicalists need not be haunted by ghosts.

最广泛讨论的反对物理学的论点之一呼吁僵尸的可想象性，僵尸在身体或功能上与人类相同，但没有意识体验。Philip Goff (Philos Phenomenol Res 81(1): 119–139, 2010; Consci Cognit 21(2): 742–746, 2012a; in Sprevak M, Kallestrup J (eds) New waves in mind of mind. Palgrave, 2014)最近提出了许多不同的反物理论论点，这些论点吸引了幽灵的可想象性，这些实体的本性被他们的意识所耗尽。如果可以想象鬼魂，这将排除先验的物理主义。如果鬼的可想象性意味着它们在形而上学上是可能的，那么这就构成了反对后验物理主义的论据的基础。借鉴 Peter Kung 的可想象性工作（Philos Phenomenol Res 81(3)：620–663, 2010, Noûs 50(1): 90–120, 2016) 和我自己对僵尸可想象性的论点的讨论（O'Conaill 在 Mihretu P Guta (ed) Consciousness and the ontology of properties. Routledge ，纽约，2019 年），我将争辩说幽灵是可以想象的，但是允许我们想象它们的东西（我们对我们想象的场景做出某些规定的能力）破坏了这样一种信念，即可想象性是可能性的可靠指南。虽然这并没有削弱 Goff 反对先验物理主义的论点，但它表明后验物理主义者不必为鬼魂所困扰。我将争辩说，鬼是可以想象的，但是允许我们想象它们的东西（我们对我们想象的场景做出某些规定的能力）破坏了这样一种信念，即想象是可能性的可靠指南。虽然这并没有削弱 Goff 反对先验物理主义的论点，但它表明后验物理主义者不必为鬼魂所困扰。我将争辩说，鬼是可以想象的，但是允许我们想象它们的东西（我们对我们想象的场景做出某些规定的能力）破坏了这样一种信念，即想象是可能性的可靠指南。虽然这并没有削弱 Goff 反对先验物理主义的论点，但它表明后验物理主义者不必为鬼魂所困扰。