Anarchy is often contrasted with law, order, or security. But anarchist societies, by which I mean societies that lack a monopoly of coercive force, need not be lawless. They can develop sophisticated legal systems that regulate the behavior of their members and protect their rights. International law, market anarchism, and other models of anarchism such as the one proposed by Chandran Kukathas already exhibit or could plausibly exhibit complex legal rules and institutions. I will show that insofar as these models rely on consent, they all share similar structural flaws, namely, that they cannot meet basic rule-of-law values such as equality before the law and access to legal remedies for wrongs that embody and respect individual moral equality, even minimally conceived. The implication of this argument is not to vindicate state-based legal systems. Rather it is to show that legal systems, state-based or not, must have a strong nonconsensual, coercive element: the process of making, applying, and enforcing law must, to some extent, be severed from consent if law is to perform its function of providing for minimal justice.

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法治与无政府状态的限度

无政府状态通常与法律、秩序或安全形成对比。但是无政府主义社会，我指的是缺乏强制力垄断的社会，不一定是无法无天的。他们可以制定复杂的法律制度来规范其成员的行为并保护他们的权利。国际法、市场无政府主义和其他无政府主义模式，例如 Chandran Kukathas 提出的模式，已经展示或可能展示出复杂的法律规则和制度。我将表明，就这些模式依赖于同意而言，它们都具有相似的结构缺陷，即它们无法满足基本的法治价值观，例如法律面前人人平等以及对体现和尊重个人的错误的法律补救措施。道德平等，即使是最低限度的设想。这一论点的含义不是要维护以国家为基础的法律制度。相反，它表明法律制度，无论是否基于国家，都必须具有强烈的非自愿、强制因素：如果法律要履行其职责，在某种程度上，制定、适用和执行法律的过程必须与同意相分离。提供最低限度的正义的功能。