When and for what reason do governments choose to monopolize violence and consolidate power? Theory suggests three channels: when the government has coercive power against the opposition, if it shifts the distribution of power in its favor, and when contingent spoils are large. Using international oil price shocks and a novel dataset on oil-producing local government areas, this article examines how commodity prices affect civil conflict in Nigeria. Results show that a rise in oil price leads to a more than proportionate increase in government attacks on rebel groups in the oil region. The findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions: positive oil price shocks increase the monopoly of violence by the government through an increase in coercion, a rise in regaining territories from rebel groups, and an increase of violence in areas with large oil fields.

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油价冲击和内战：来自尼日利亚的证据

政府何时以及出于什么原因选择垄断暴力和巩固权力？理论提出了三个渠道：当政府对反对派拥有强制权力时，如果它改变了对自己有利的权力分配，以及当偶然的战利品很大时。本文使用国际油价冲击和产油地方政府区域的新数据集，研究商品价格如何影响尼日利亚的内战。结果表明，石油价格上涨导致政府对石油地区反叛组织的袭击增加了超过成比例的增加。研究结果与理论预测一致：积极的石油价格冲击增加了政府对暴力的垄断，通过增加胁迫、从反叛组织手中夺回领土的增加、