Abstract

Why did the July 1914 crisis—but not crises in 1905, 1908–9, 1911, and 1912–13—escalate to great-power war despite occurring under similar international and domestic conditions? Explanations based on underlying and slowly changing structural, social, or cultural variables cannot answer this question. Examining three Balkan crises of 1912–13 and the July Crisis, we refine realist explanations based on power, alliances, and reputational interests by incorporating the impact of changing power distributions and alliances in the Balkans on the great-power security system. A more complete answer to the why-1914-but-not-before question, however, requires the incorporation of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, which went beyond a pretext for war. It eliminated the most powerful and effective proponent for peace in Vienna and fundamentally changed the nature of the decision-making process in Austria-Hungary. Counterfactually, we argue that a hypothetical crisis with Franz Ferdinand present would probably have ended differently.

摘要

为什么 1914 年 7 月的危机——而不是 1905、1908-9、1911 和 1912-13 年的危机——升级为大国战争，尽管发生在相似的国际和国内条件下？基于潜在的和缓慢变化的结构、社会或文化变量的解释无法回答这个问题。通过考察 1912-13 年的三场巴尔干危机和七月危机，我们通过纳入巴尔干地区不断变化的权力分配和联盟对大国安全体系的影响，完善基于权力、联盟和声誉利益的现实主义解释。然而，对为什么 1914 年而不是之前的问题的更完整的回答需要纳入弗朗茨·费迪南德的暗杀，这超出了战争的借口。它消除了维也纳最强大和最有效的和平支持者，并从根本上改变了奥匈帝国决策过程的性质。与事实相反，我们认为弗朗茨·费迪南德在场的假设危机可能会以不同的方式结束。