Various observers have emphasized a recalibration of India’s stance towards the Middle East under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. These accounts have generally highlighted Modi’s public overtures toward Israel, including an unprecedented 2017 visit, as public signs of a break with India’s traditional pro-Arab and pro-Palestine approach. Others have interpreted Modi’s successive visits to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar, and Oman as indicators of a new outreach to all relevant actors in the region. However, has this diplomatic balancing among regional stakeholders signalled a substantial foreign policy change? Can this apparent policy shift be attributed to the personal preferences of Modi? Or Can India’s fluctuating Middle-East policy be explained by a wider number of fluid international and regional opportunities and constraints? Alternatively, can factors such as ideological and religious politics at the national and regional levels also help account for changes (or the absence thereof) in India’s Middle-East policy? Building on foreign policy scholarship, this paper offers to derive theoretical understandings and expectations about Modi’s role in (re)shaping this regional policy in order to problematizes the conventional understanding of Modi’s engagement with the Middle East as a sign of substantial foreign policy change.

各种观察家都强调要重新调整印度在总理纳伦德拉·莫迪 (Narendra Modi) 领导下对中东的立场。这些报道普遍强调了莫迪对以色列的公开示好，包括 2017 年前所未有的访问，这是与印度传统的亲阿拉伯和亲巴勒斯坦做法决裂的公开迹象。其他人则将莫迪对阿拉伯联合酋长国、沙特阿拉伯、伊朗、卡塔尔和阿曼的连续访问解释为与该地区所有相关参与者进行新的外联活动的指标。然而，区域利益相关者之间的这种外交平衡是否预示着外交政策的重大变化？这种明显的政策转变能否归因于莫迪的个人偏好？或者，印度波动的中东政策是否可以用更广泛的国际和地区机遇和制约因素来解释？或者，国家和地区层面的意识形态和宗教政治等因素是否也有助于解释印度中东政策的变化（或没有变化）？在外交政策学术研究的基础上，本文提供了对莫迪在（重新）塑造该区域政策中的作用的理论理解和期望，以便将莫迪与中东接触的传统理解视为重大外交政策变化的标志。国家和地区层面的意识形态和宗教政治等因素是否也有助于解释印度中东政策的变化（或没有变化）？在外交政策学术研究的基础上，本文提供了对莫迪在（重新）塑造该区域政策中的作用的理论理解和期望，以便将莫迪与中东接触的传统理解视为重大外交政策变化的标志。国家和地区层面的意识形态和宗教政治等因素是否也有助于解释印度中东政策的变化（或没有变化）？在外交政策学术研究的基础上，本文提供了对莫迪在（重新）塑造该区域政策中的作用的理论理解和期望，以便将莫迪与中东接触的传统理解视为重大外交政策变化的标志。