The development of the Internet has dramatically changed firms' business models. Companies can now use both virtual and physical channels to enhance their competitiveness and profitability. In addition, bundling is a commonly used promotion strategy, although managers should consider the characteristics of the candidate bundled products. This study proposes a two-stage game theoretic model, in which a manufacturer may start an online channel along with an existing physical one which is operated by a dealer, i.e., a bricks-and-clicks approach, to examine the bundling and pricing strategy when selling two products with different network externalities. In the first stage, the manufacturer offers the products to the dealer, who may sell the two products individually or in a bundle to customers. In the second stage, and with the aim of expanding market share, the manufacturer may consider starting an online channel to integrate with the existing physical channel. We consider four cases, in which the manufacturer and dealer may sell the two products either individually or bundled in the two channels, in order to obtain the corresponding optimal pricing strategies with the aim of maximizing their profits. We also perform a numerical analysis to investigate the effects that network externality has on the bundling strategies and profits of the two channels. The results indicate that the bricks-and-clicks business model benefits both the manufacturer and dealer, and their profits would increase as network externality increases. In particular, when the network externalities of the two products are both high, a mixed strategy, which sells the two products in a bundle in the online channel and individually in the physical channel, should be adopted.

中文翻译：

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考虑网络外部性的实体公司的捆绑和定价决策

互联网的发展极大地改变了企业的商业模式。公司现在可以同时使用虚拟和物理渠道来提高竞争力和盈利能力。此外，捆绑是一种常用的促销策略，但管理者应考虑候选捆绑产品的特点。本研究提出了一个两阶段博弈论模型，在该模型中，制造商可以在现有的由经销商运营的实体渠道的基础上启动在线渠道，即砖块和点击方法，以检查捆绑和定价策略当销售两种具有不同网络外部性的产品时。在第一阶段，制造商将产品提供给经销商，经销商可以将两种产品单独或捆绑销售给客户。在第二阶段，为了扩大市场份额，厂商可以考虑开设线上渠道，与现有的实体渠道进行整合。我们考虑四种情况，制造商和经销商可以单独或在两个渠道中捆绑销售两种产品，以获得相应的最优定价策略，以实现利润最大化。我们还进行了数值分析，以研究网络外部性对两个渠道的捆绑策略和利润的影响。结果表明，实体店商业模式对制造商和经销商都有利，随着网络外部性的增加，他们的利润会增加。特别是当两种产品的网络外部性都很高时，混合策略，