As manufacturers may engage in both direct sale and wholesale, the channel conflict between manufacturer and retailer becomes inevitable. This paper considers a dual-channel supply chain in which a retailer sells the product through store channel with sales effort while the manufacturer holds a direct channel and may provide an incentive measure to share the cost of sales effort. To meet social responsibility, a penalty on the total resource consumed is imposed on the manufacturer. We present a manufacturer-led decentralized model in which both members maximize individual profit, and then derive the corresponding optimal direct/store price and wholesale price. The dual-channel supply chain model without sales effort policy is also considered so as to explain the effects of sales effort policy and sharing cost measure on both parties. Special properties are presented to show (ⅰ) the influence of retailer's sales effort and manufacturer's sharing cost on the optimal strategies; (ⅱ) the resource-utilized penalty on the optimal decisions. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to highlight the influence of various parameters on optimal solutions. We find that if the market response to retailer's sales effort is strong or the manufacturer's sharing portion of sales effort cost is increased, the retailer's profit and store selling price increase while the manufacturer's profit decreases and the direct sale and wholesale prices do not change. We also show that if the consumer's value on direct channel exceeds a threshold, the manufacturer's profit will be greater than that of the retailer. Moreover, if the market response to retailer's sales effort is strong, manufacturer's profit will be lesser than retailer's profit.

中文翻译：

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具有资源利用惩罚的双渠道供应链问题：谁能从销售努力中受益？

由于制造商可能同时从事直销和批发，因此制造商和零售商之间的渠道冲突不可避免。本文考虑了一个双渠道供应链，其中零售商通过商店渠道销售产品，制造商拥有直接渠道，并可能提供一种激励措施来分担销售成本。为了履行社会责任，对制造商所消耗的资源总量进行处罚。我们提出了一个制造商主导的去中心化模型，其中两个成员都最大化个人利润，然后推导出相应的最优直销/门店价格和批发价格。还考虑了没有销售努力政策的双渠道供应链模型，以解释销售努力政策和分摊成本措施对双方的影响。给出了特殊性质以显示（ⅰ）零售商的销售努力和制造商的分摊成本对最优策略的影响；(ⅱ) 对最优决策的资源利用惩罚。最后，进行数值实验以突出各种参数对最优解的影响。我们发现，如果市场对零售商的销售努力反应强烈或制造商分摊的销售努力成本增加，则零售商的利润和门店售价增加，而制造商的利润下降，直销和批发价格不变。我们还表明，如果消费者在直接渠道上的价值超过阈值，制造商的利润将大于零售商的利润。此外，如果市场对零售商的反应