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Quality competition and coordination in a VMI supply chain with two risk-averse manufacturers
Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization ( IF 1.2 ) Pub Date : 2020-05-19 , DOI: 10.3934/jimo.2020100
Bin Chen , Wenying Xie , Fuyou Huang , Juan He

Quality competition and risk aversion have become more and more common in today's many industries, making it a challenge to supply chain management and coordination. This paper considers a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) supply chain comprising two risk-averse manufacturers who sell their competing products through a common retailer. Market demand shared by each manufacturer is dependent on the quality level of its own product as well as on the competitor's product quality. The Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) criterion is employed to formulate the risk aversion of manufacturers. This study first develops basic models without coordination mechanism and analyzes the effect of the quality sensitivity, competition intensity, risk aversion degree and cost coefficient of quality improvement on equilibrium decisions and supply chain efficiency. Further, a combined contract composed of option and cost-sharing is proposed to investigate the supply chain coordination issue. The results reveal that the combined contract can coordinate the supply chain and achieve a win-win outcome only when the manufacturers are low in risk aversion, and the system-wide profit of the supply chain can be allocated arbitrarily only by the option price. Also, this research examines the effect of the quality sensitivity, competition intensity, risk aversion degree and cost coefficient of quality improvement on the feasible region of option price.

中文翻译:

具有两个规避风险的制造商的 VMI 供应链中的质量竞争和协调

质量竞争和风险规避在当今许多行业中变得越来越普遍,这对供应链管理和协调提出了挑战。本文考虑了由两个规避风险的制造商组成的供应商管理库存 (VMI) 供应链,这些制造商通过一家普通零售商销售其竞争产品。每个制造商共享的市场需求取决于其自身产品的质量水平以及竞争对手的产品质量。条件风险价值 (CVaR) 标准用于制定制造商的风险规避。本研究首先建立了无协调机制的基本模型,分析了质量敏感性、竞争强度、风险规避程度和质量改进成本系数对均衡决策和供应链效率的影响。此外,提出了一个由期权和成本分摊组成的联合合同来研究供应链协调问题。结果表明,只有在制造商风险厌恶程度较低的情况下,联合契约才能协调供应链并实现双赢,并且仅通过期权价格就可以任意分配供应链的全系统利润。此外,本研究还考察了质量敏感性、竞争强度、风险规避程度和质量改进成本系数对期权价格可行域的影响。结果表明,只有在制造商风险厌恶程度较低的情况下,联合契约才能协调供应链并实现双赢,并且仅通过期权价格就可以任意分配供应链的全系统利润。此外,本研究还考察了质量敏感性、竞争强度、风险规避程度和质量改进成本系数对期权价格可行域的影响。结果表明,只有在制造商风险厌恶程度较低的情况下,联合契约才能协调供应链并实现双赢,并且仅通过期权价格就可以任意分配供应链的全系统利润。此外,本研究还考察了质量敏感性、竞争强度、风险规避程度和质量改进成本系数对期权价格可行域的影响。
更新日期:2020-05-19
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