ABSTRACT

According to the ‘standard story’ in the philosophy of action, actions are those movements of a creature’s body that are caused and rationalized by the creature’s mental states. The attractions of the causal condition have been widely discussed. The rationalization condition is nearly ubiquitous, but it is notoriously obscure, and its motivation has rarely been made explicit. This paper presents a new argument for including the rationalization condition in the causal theory of action, and sketches a broadly Davidsonian theory of what rationalization is.

中文翻译：

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行动与合理化

摘要

根据行动哲学中的“标准故事”，行动是由生物的心理状态引起并合理化的生物身体的那些运动。因果条件的吸引力已被广泛讨论。合理化条件几乎无处不在，但它是出了名的模糊，其动机很少被明确说明。本文提出了在行动因果理论中包含合理化条件的新论点，并勾画了一个广义的关于什么是合理化的戴维森理论。