当前位置: X-MOL 学术Managerial Finance › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
CEO social capital and asset sell-offs
Managerial Finance ( IF 1.9 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-07 , DOI: 10.1108/mf-02-2020-0085
Charles Danso , Margarita Kaprielyan , Md Miran Hossain

Purpose

Recent studies explore how chief executive officer (CEO) social capital affects corporate decision-making. Well-connected CEOs can have greater access to information, which can lead to better corporate decisions or permit them to amass power from hierarchy status and make self-serving decisions. This study examines whether investors perceive CEO social capital as a signal of good decision-making (assuming information asymmetry) surrounding asset sell-off events.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use multivariate regression analysis to examine the effect of CEO social capital on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the asset buyers and sellers. CARs are estimated using a market model in the period proximate to asset sell-off announcements.

Findings

The authors find that CEO social capital is positively associated with announcement returns of the asset sellers. Moreover, the positive effect of CEO social capital on announcement returns is more pronounced for sellers facing greater information asymmetry. An analysis of post-announcement stock performance reveals that the seller CEO social capital is associated with additional value generated for the shareholders of the seller after a month from the announcement date, especially if the transaction price is disclosed. Overall, findings are consistent with the argument that CEO social capital provides value in high information asymmetry environment.

Originality/value

To the authors' knowledge this is the first study to examine the effect of CEO social capital on the shareholders' wealth created by divestitures.



中文翻译:

CEO 社会资本和资产抛售

目的

最近的研究探讨了首席执行官 (CEO) 社会资本如何影响公司决策。人脉广泛的 CEO 可以获得更多的信息,这可以导致更好的公司决策或允许他们从等级地位中积累权力并做出自我服务的决策。本研究考察了投资者是否将 CEO 社会资本视为围绕资产抛售事件做出良好决策(假设信息不对称)的信号。

设计/方法/方法

作者使用多元回归分析来检验 CEO 社会资本对资产买家和卖家的累积异常收益 (CAR) 的影响。资本充足率是在资产出售公告附近的时期使用市场模型估计的。

发现

作者发现 CEO 社会资本与资产卖方的公告收益呈正相关。此外,对于面临更大信息不对称的卖家而言,CEO社会资本对公告收益的正向影响更为明显。对公告后股票表现的分析表明,卖方 CEO 社会资本与公告之日起一个月后为卖方股东产生的附加价值相关,尤其是在交易价格被披露的情况下。总体而言,研究结果与 CEO 社会资本在高度信息不对称环境中提供价值的论点一致。

原创性/价值

据作者所知,这是第一项研究 CEO 社会资本对资产剥离所创造的股东财富的影响的研究。

更新日期:2021-06-07
down
wechat
bug